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The biological warfare (BW) threat to U.S. Naval Surface Forces (NSF) is real 
but not well understood.  Greater awareness about the threat is essential for U.S. NSF to 
establish key competencies to counter its effects.  Commanding Officers (COs) and 
Officers in Tactical Command (OTCs) will be placed in positions where they must 
combat challenges from adversaries who will seek to use BW.  This thesis identifies what 
can be done to enhance NSF capabilities to counter BW.   
Having neglected the BW threat, the U.S. Navy seeks to improve its preparedness 
by exploiting the development of key bio-defense systems.  While some of these systems 
including Joint Portal Shield and the Joint Biological Point Detection System will soon 
be deployed, the Navy still lacks doctrine, organizational modifications, training and 
education, and leadership to take advantage of these new technological systems.     
This thesis suggests that Local Unit Practices (LPs) prescribed by COs and OTCs 
should be established to match each unit’s capability and sustainability to the threat.  To 
do so, requires an institutional revolution that maximizes NSF doctrine and Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) which tie directly into LPs to provide the means for 
BW defense and protection. 
An adversary will not seek to engage the U.S. Navy on the high seas, where the 
United States holds absolute dominance.  Rather, it would seek to prevent U.S. NSF from 
entering littorals and foreign ports by massive attrition, and small-scale, asymmetric 
attacks.  By targeting ports and airfields, an adversary could block U.S. entry into a 
region and cut off logistics needed to support U.S. and allied forces in theater. 
Currently training and doctrine represent less than two percent of appropriations 
in FY 2001.  Additionally, training and doctrine programs for BW defense rank at the 
bottom of a priority list of 135 items.  This thesis recommends institutionalization of 
training and education, doctrine, leadership organizations, and humans who possess the 
right capabilities, to take advantage of technology to counter the threat. 
xx 
There are three reasons why the U.S. Navy should be investing more in BW 
defense.  First, adversaries may wish to deny or deter U.S. access into a region or theater.  
Second, BW are relatively inexpensive, easily camouflaged within commercial ventures, 
potentially as devastating as nuclear weapons, and are becoming the “poor man’s nuclear 
weapons.”  Third, BW agents can be used in different scenarios with varying effects 
against substantial U.S. NSF vulnerabilities.  
U.S. NSF often are first to arrive on the scene of some crisis.  The question is not 
whether attacks on American forces will take place in the future, but when and where 
they will occur.  The terrorist attack on USS COLE (DDG-67) highlighted the constant 
dangers confronting NSF.  Protection should include measures that enable warriors to 
survive and operate in a BW environment; with current capabilities they cannot in “total” 
without unifying under the rubric of Consequence Management (CM).   
The thesis reports on comprehensive, fleet wide understanding of BW threats and 
addresses the need for codified warfighting doctrine, relevant TTPs, and sound LPs to 
revolutionize U.S. NSF power against BW aggressors.  It consists of five chapters.  
Chapter one introduces the author’s research statement, a description of threats and an 
examination of motives for using BW.  Chapter two describes the BW threat to U.S. NSF 
and defines state and non-state actors through case assessment, and provides a 
categorization of BW agents and possible delivery systems.  Chapter three evaluates Fleet 
detection capabilities, highlighting the Navy’s BW Executive Agent, detection and 
protection technologies, and means for sustaining the mission in contaminated 
environments.  Chapter four presents options for sustaining the mission through 
Consequence Management (CM), and Health Service Support (HSS).  Chapter five 










U.S. Naval Surface forces (NSF) must possess the capability to counter biological 
warfare (BW) threats, and be prepared to survive, fight, and prevail in contaminated 
environments.  Integrated on the Fleet level, leaders and operators should be prepared, 
across the spectrum, to operate in contaminated environments unencumbered by the BW 
threat.  To date there exists no single doctrine against a biological weapons (BW) threat 
to NSF.     
DoD coordinates the integration of biological programs and directs improvements 
in readiness to survive, fight and win in contaminated environments.  It provides policy to 
eliminate unnecessarily redundant programs, and funds program priorities and overall 
readiness.1  To date, the U.S. Navy has taken delivery of numerous technological systems 
but has not produced fleet wide doctrine and TTPs that will fully enable NSF to deter or 
thwart the BW threat.    
The United States now faces what could be called a superpower paradox.  The 
unrivaled supremacy of the United States in the conventional military arena is prompting 
adversaries to seek asymmetric means to strike what is perceived as the Achilles heel of 
the United States.2  The May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review concluded 
that U.S. defense planners must assume that use of BW is a “likely condition of future 
warfare” and that these are likely to be used “early in the conflict to disrupt U.S. 
operations and logistics.”3 
Commanding Officer (COs) and Officers in Tactical Command (OTCs) require 
revolutionary mechanisms for combating challenges from adversaries armed with 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  Joint doctrine and joint tactical requirements 
                                                 
1   Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: 
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), U.S. GPO, March 2000), 5.  Available at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/chembio02012000.pdf. 
2  Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Proliferation:  Threat and Response  (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Government 
Printing Office [U.S. GPO], January 2001), i. 
3   Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, May 
1997), 13. 
2 
necessitate development of naval doctrine, and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
(TTPs) that enable NSF to decrease vulnerabilities and defeat the threat.  
Joint Publication 3-11 sets forth basic principles to assist commanders and staffs 
plan and conduct operations in which their forces may encounter BW, provides guidance 
for exercise of authority by combatant commanders, and prescribes doctrine for joint 
operations and training.  It directs that “all organizations of the Armed Forces of the 
United States subject to joint doctrine” be responsible for ensuring that their forces and 
facilities be prepared and trained to operate in BW environments.4   
The September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report stated that “the United 
States is likely to be challenged by adversaries with Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD), and that geopolitical and military trends will profoundly shape future security 
environments.”5  Future adversaries will seek to counter U.S. strengths and exploit its 
weaknesses.  They will reap political and military benefits if they can limit the freedom 
of action on the part of U.S. armed forces by threatening high-value targets.  
Nation-states may view BW as means to become a regional power, reduce 
Western influence, or deter U.S. intervention in regional conflicts.  By targeting points of 
debarkation such as ports and airfields, an adversary could block NSF entry into a region 
and cut off logistics needed to support U.S. and allied forces in the theater.  Some actors 
may acquire BW to offset U.S. conventional superiority by threatening use against 
forward deployed U.S. NSF, airbases, or seaports.6     
The breakup of the Soviet Union, the dominance of the United States as a 
conventional power, and the rise of radical groups have raised concern regarding the use 
of BW against military forces in combat.7  According to DoD, at least 25 countries now 
                                                 
4   Joint Publication 3-11 is the Chairman, Joint Chiefs, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and 
Chemical (NBC) Environments, (Washington, D.C.:  CJCS, 11 July 2000), i – I-8. 
5   Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. GPO, 
September 2001), 3. 
6   Steven Metz, Armed Conflict in the 21st Century:  The Information Revolution and Post-Modern Warfare (Carlisle:  
Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, April 2000), 40-45. 
7   Franz, Jahrling, Friedlander, and others, “Clinical Recognition and Management of Patients Exposed to Biological 
Warfare Agents”, in Joshua Lederberg, Biological Weapons:  Limiting the Threat, (Cambridge, MA:  BCSIA Studies 
International Security, MIT Press, 1999), 37. 
3 
possess, or are acquiring or developing, BW or the means to deliver them.  BW also has 
found its way into the hands of non-state actors.8   
Ships, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, small boats and Marine Corps vehicles ─ all 
NSF platforms involved in power projection─, require protection from BW and should be 
prepared through doctrine, institutionalized TTPs, fleet-wide use of LPs, and effective 
training programs that harness current and emerging technologies as means for detecting, 
identifying, and protecting U.S. NSF against the BW threat.  
In the logic of the anti-access approach, an opponent would not seek to engage the 
U.S. Navy on the high seas, where the United States holds absolute dominance.  Rather, it 
would seek to prevent U.S. NSF forces from entering littorals and foreign ports by 
massive attrition, and small-scale, asymmetric attacks.9  State and non-state actors might 
now have the capability to deter or deny U.S. national interests. 
B. ARGUMENT 
This thesis examines the effects BW use by state and non-state actors could have 
against U.S. NSF.  It explores the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter the threat in the areas of 
doctrine, TTPs, detection and protection technologies, Consequence Management (CM), 
and Health Services Support (HSS).  It recognizes a lack of current doctrine and TTPs, 
and proposes the development of Local Unit Practices (LPs) as a means to protect forces 
and sustain the mission.10    
It poses, among others, the following questions:  How could BW be used to 
effectively deter U.S. NSF power projection?  Could BW use against maritime ports and 
air facilities slow, or negate, capabilities to position NSF during a crisis or major 
conflict?  Could an aggressor employ BW to cripple on-going U.S. Navy operations?  For 
example, might an aggressor launch BW strikes against main seaports or airfields of 
debarkation to disrupt the flow of U.S. combat aircraft, troops, heavy military hardware, 
munitions, and other supplies into theater?  
                                                 
8   Office of Secretary of Defense, Proliferation:  Threat and Response, i. 
9   Sam J. Tangredi, “The Future Security Environment, 2001-2025:  Toward a Consensus View,” in Michele A. 
Flournoy, ed., QDR 2001 Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, (Washington, D.C.:  National Defense University 
Press, 2001), 38. 
10   For more clarity on military doctrine see Scott D. Sagan, “The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and 
Control Systems,” in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable:  How New Powers 
Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 2000), 16-46. 
4 
If BW attacks were launched during of a short-warning invasion, could such an 
attack buy sufficient time to achieve military objectives, or to disperse an adversary's 
forces, thereby forcing the United States to consider conceding or accepting much larger 
costs?  And, by what means is the U.S. Navy enhancing (1) detection and protection 
capabilities, (2) changes in doctrinal responses, (3) TTPs, and (4) assessments of ships, 
amphibious landing forces, and force-wide LPs necessary to counter the BW threat, now 
and in the future? 
Fundamentally, the U.S. Navy needs means to win or avoid engagements with 
evolving BW threats, and to do so in stride while projecting power from the Sea.  Navy 
platforms encounter threats from weapons, sensors, countermeasures, and stealthy 
systems and must overcome them with organic means of self-defense, without diversion 
from their mission.   
The former Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig stated: “there is a regrettable 
tendency to think about defense against biological warfare either as unnecessary or as 
‘too hard.’”  He went on to say: “vulnerabilities to BW attacks are substantial…many 
blind spots are beyond our control…many, however, are self inflicted -- they are a result 
of our under-investment and lack of attention.  In short, by our neglect we are ourselves 
creating incentives (for adversaries) to use BW.”11 
How might a BW attack on naval forces compare to the attack on USS COLE 
(DDG-67) on 12 October 2000?12  Terror tactics threaten to undermine U.S. strengths by 
attacking political will.  The COLE attack dramatically demonstrates the vulnerability of 
deployed naval forces.  It spotlighted vulnerabilities surface ships face during in-port 
operations, or operating within the confines of a harbor or anchorage environment.  The 
advantages of a modern warship are largely erased when deprived of the ability to 
maneuver or use its primary weapons.  A ship might find itself in the unenviable position 
of being vulnerable to an assailant who takes advantage of a ship’s close proximity to 
land and the availability of low-cost, short-range delivery methods.13 
                                                 
11   Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig,  “Biological Warfare:  A Nation at Risk -- A Time to Act,” (Washington, 
D.C.:  National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies Press, No. 58, January 1996). 
12   Kristin S. Kolet, “Asymmetric Threats to the United States,” National Institute for Public Policy, (Fall 2001), 286-
287.   
13   Department of the Navy (DoN) Surface Warfare Development Group (SWDG). Tactical Memo (TACMEMO) 
SWDG 3-20.4-01 (Little Creek:  Department of the Navy Printing Office [NPO], February 2001), 1-1(U). 
5 
C. THE THREAT   
The United States relies heavily on its navy for global power projection.  
Adversaries respect the power and technological sophistication of the U.S. Navy and 
recognize that the potential for parity on the high seas is impossible.  Attacking the U.S. 
Navy asymmetrically using BW is a viable strategy to marginalize the technological 
superiority of U.S. NSF. 
There are three compelling reasons why the U.S. Navy should be investing more 
in BW defense.  First, adversaries whose strategies perceive American reluctance to 
accept high mortality rates may wish to challenge U.S. NSF in attempts to deny or deter 
U.S. access into a region or theater.14  Second, because BW are relatively inexpensive, 
easy to camouflage within commercial ventures, and potentially as devastating as nuclear 
weapons, they hold promise for becoming the “poor man’s nuclear weapons.”15  Third, 
current U.S. NSF vulnerabilities are substantial.16  BW agents can be used in different 
scenarios with varying effects.  The target and nature of the attack determine which agent 
is used and how it is delivered.17   
A BW attack might cause widespread infection and death, resulting in the failure 
of U.S. military action.  While precision with BW is difficult, an attack would seek to 
employ weapons directly against ships and amphibious landing forces.  The preferred 
agents for such an attack may not result in death, but, rather, cause severe disability and 
disorientation.18   
1. Motivations of State and Non-State Actors 
Despite international attempts to combat BW proliferation by enacting and 
strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), many countries are pursuing 
offensive BW capabilities.19  Non-state actors also have already turned to BW.  
Heightened awareness of state BW threats and military adaptations may have the 
                                                 
14   Under Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig, “Why Defense against Biological Warfare Should be a Priority,” 
Surface Warfare Magazine (November/December 1996), 10.  
15   United States Government (USG), The Worldwide Biological Warfare Threat (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. GPO), 16.  
16   Danzig, “Why Defense Against Biological Warfare Should be a Priority,” 11. 
17   USG, The Worldwide Biological Warfare Threat, 16.  Basic Operational-Use-Scenarios include those for strategic, 
tactical, and special operations forces, as well as for state sponsored terrorism purposes. 
18   Ibid., 16. 
19   Vernon Loeb, “U.S. Won’t Back Plan to Enforce Germ Pact:  Draft ‘Unworkable,’ Bush official says,” Washington 
Post, (21 July 2001), 1.  More than 140 countries, including the United States, have ratified the BWC.  The Treaty lacks any 
effective means of enforcement.  Negotiations on a protocol for verifying compliance have been underway since 1995. 
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unintended effect of inspiring non-state actors, or they may act as proxies for state 
actors.20   
Many more countries are now capable of attacking U.S. NSF with BW than with 
nuclear weapons.  BW is sometimes dismissed as dangerous and ineffective by those who 
do not know that such weapons can achieve lethality levels consistent with low-yield 
nuclear weapons or that biotechnology makes their production and controlled use easier 
than in times past.21   
Iraq, Iran, North Korea, China, Russia, Syria, and Libya are all thought to possess 
deliverable BW capabilities.22  BW programs are all conducted in secret.  Except for Iraq 
and Russia, no state openly admits to having built deliverable weapons.  Under this cloak 
of secrecy, BW have accumulated in the arsenals of states that are willing to violate their 
own sovereign commitments not to break taboos against such weapons, to not support 
terrorism, and not to use BW against enemies.23 
2. Why BW Presents the Greatest Danger  
The process of developing BW is complex but not too difficult.  Three steps are 
required:  (1) development of a stock culture of the desired agent, (2) acquisition of the 
appropriate equipment for production of the biological agent and manufacture of 
munitions, and (3) qualified technicians for production, testing, and evaluation, creation 
of delivery systems, and fitting agents to those systems.  The ease in obtaining a stock 
culture of a desired organism is one of the greatest dangers of BW.24  
According to OSD, the availability of technologies, expertise, and information 
stems from the willingness of various state suppliers to sell BW materials and 
technologies, and a veritable information explosion from academic and commercial 
sources.  It also may be fueled by weakened security at some key nuclear, biological and 
chemical (NBC) facilities in Russia, the search for employment by unemployed scientists 
                                                 
20   Non-state actors will not necessarily follow the strategies or tactics of state directed military-style attacks.  In fact, 
they could use weapons that do not have the same requirements for dependability, ruggedness, or sophistication, and that do 
not resemble state actor capabilities at all. 
21   Brad Roberts, “Rethinking the Proliferation Debate:  A Commentary,” Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, (Summer 
1995), 793. 
22   Ibid., 800. 
23   Ibid. 
24   Office of Secretary of Defense, Proliferation:  Threat and Response, 4. 
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and technicians (the “brain drain), and the transfer or sharing of technology among states 
trying to develop programs.25  
Medical developments are particularly troubling because virtually all the 
equipment, technology, and materials needed for BW agent research and development 
and production are dual-use.  Any state or non-state actor with the political will and a 
competent scientific base available in civilian industrial or scientific enterprises can 
produce toxins or infectious agents, which include viruses, bacteria, and rickettsiae.26 
BW use against theater-level targets offers the most lucrative and cost-effective 
employment option of all forms of WMD.  BW enjoy the same deterring effect as CW on 
the battlefield, but can be far more potent in effect.27  While all WMD are lethal, it is 
clear that, on a bomb-for-bomb basis, BW could rival or exceed the killing power of 
nuclear weapons in the sense that BW also possess the potential to begin epidemics that 
could cause fatalities far beyond the point of contact.28  
D. IMPLICATIONS  
1. U.S. Naval Surface Forces 
COs and OTCs must understand NSF vulnerabilities to BW attacks that could 
employ very small amounts of agent with catastrophic results.  What specific systems and 
capabilities will enable U.S. NSF to sustain the mission and prevail in a contaminated 
environment?  More specifically, what are the TTPs for countering BW, and what 
doctrine will the U.S. Navy follow?  Those accountable should have the means to answer 
the threat just as with any other warfare area.  Those in command require institutional 
guidance from which to develop and disseminate LPs for those they lead.   
CBDP invests heavily in battlefield reconnaissance vehicles, sensor networks for 
detecting large area attacks, theater warning and reporting for multiple attacks, and 
protective ensembles to enable combat operations in BW environments.  In August 2001, 
                                                 
25  Ibid., 3.  An offensive program must have people with the technical skills and knowledge of production and 
weaponization of agents.  Subsequent to the Cold War, the Russians are committed to the security of weapons-useable 
materials, but continuing turmoil in society, corruption, and resource shortages complicate the ability of Russian officials to 
safeguard BW advances.  Other states and non-state actors, including terrorist groups, seek to acquire these materials and 
employ extreme means to buttress this security shortfall against Russia’s societal bent towards corruption.   
26  Ibid., 4. 
27  Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., “The Rise of Asymmetric Threats:  Priorities for Defense Planning,” in Michele A. 
Flournoy, ed., QDR 2001 Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, (Washington, D.C.:  National Defense University 
Press, 2001), 84.  
28  Barry R. Scheider, Future War and Counterproliferation; U.S. Military Response to NBC Proliferation Threats, 
(Westport:  Praeger, 1999), 93. 
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initial testing began onboard U.S. Navy ships introducing the Joint Biological Point 
Detection System (JBPDS).29  What remains missing is codified doctrine, TTPs, and LPs. 
There is no evidence to suggest that operators could adopt a common posture in 
the case of a BW attack, or incident.30  While the manageability of a BW attack can be 
debated, operational and tactical preparation will serve both deterrent and counter-
proliferation strategies.  
2. The Road Ahead 
The U.S. Navy possess a wide range of detection technologies that represent good 
first steps in meeting CBDP requirements; however, current training and doctrine 
appropriations represent less than two percent of CBDP appropriations in FY 2001.  
Additionally, training and doctrine programs rank numbers 128, 132, 133, and 135 
respectively in the priority list of 135 programs in the Joint Service Nuclear, Biological 
and Chemical (NBC) Defense Modernization Plan (JSNDMP).31  These and many other 
issues should be addressed in the development of future BW defense strategies. 
New technologies for detection and protection, health services support and 
consequence management are being evaluated.  Chief among them is the Joint Biological 
Point Detection System (JBPDS), which includes the Joint Point - Man-Portable XM96, 
and the Joint Point - Shelter XM97, designed for detection, warning, collection, and 
identification of BW agents.32  Procurement of decontamination development systems is 
underway, for a lightweight, modular, decontamination system that will reduce the 
logistics burden compared to existing systems.33  New concepts and technologies are 
being fielded to network joint systems for decontamination of ports and airfields, and 
efforts are being pursued to develop a decontaminant for sensitive equipment (e.g., 
                                                 
29   Obtained through personal interview with George W. (Bill) Gates.  NSWC Crane Division, Code 805D, 6 
September 2001.  JBPDS is the initial stage for providing “network” point detection protection to forces in BW environments.    
30   Mr. Christopher J. Vogt and Mr. Peter Novick writing for the Navy Warfare Development Command, Maritime 
Battle Center, in Newport, Rhode Island, assert: “the current approach is a holdover from the Cold War, against an adversary 
who planned to saturate the northern German plain with VX before driving its tank divisions to the Rhine.”  Chris Vogt, is 
Naval Scientific Advisor to COMSEVENTH Fleet.   Most of his efforts have been leading CP-related experiments in the 
Navy’s FBE program.  Mr. Pete Novick, a retired Surface Warfare Commander, is Emergency Management/CBR-D Officer 
for U.S. Naval Forces Japan, with shore installation management responsibility for Japan and Diego Garcia.  
31   Joint Service Integration Group.  “Joint Service Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense Modernization 
Plan,” (DRAFT, November 2000). 
32   Once operationally tested and fielded throughout all services, it will possess the capability of providing a detection 
network throughout BW threat areas. 
33   Critical shortfalls remain to replace the current decontamination solution with one that is non-aqueous, non-
corrosive, and environmentally safe. 
9 
electronics); however, technologies alone will not provide adequate means for effective 
BW defense. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of five chapters.  Chapter one introduces the author’s research 
statement and questions to be addressed, a background of threats from actors and an 
examination of motives for using BW and implications for NSF, and entering precepts. 
Chapter two describes the BW threat, defines state and non-state actors through case 
assessment, and provides a categorization of BW agents, and delivery systems.  Chapter 
three evaluates Fleet capabilities, highlighting the Navy’s BW Executive Agent, 
considers methods for protecting the force, and covers detection and protection 
technologies, and the means for sustaining the mission in BW contaminated 
environments.  Chapter four presents options for sustaining the mission through CM, and 
HSS, and concludes that adapting a “collective protection” approach using all of the 
capabilities DoD forces can provide is the most lucrative solution for BW defense.  
Chapter five summarizes the main findings of this thesis and plots a “Way Ahead” in the 
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II. THE BW THREAT TO U.S. NAVAL FORCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
How could biological weapons (BW) be used to thwart U.S. Naval Surface forces 
(NSF) ability to project power?  Although they are usually seen as less threatening than 
nuclear weapons, biological agents can inflict massive casualties.34  BW can be used in a 
limited fashion, for example, against amphibious landing forces, materials, and 
equipment, and for point attacks against ships and naval task forces.  BW use against 
airfields, once considered unlikely because of the time for BW to work and their 
susceptibility to meteorological and prophylactic factors, has become a significant threat 
due to enhanced bio-technology.35  
The Department of Defense (DoD) report, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 
2001, presents a troubling vision of the threat.36  Regional actors may employ anti-access 
strategies using BW to thwart U.S. power projection.  Experts agree that BW 
technologies and associated delivery systems will continue to be diffused to state and 
non-state actors through sales, modification of dual-use systems and material, and 
through indigenous development programs.37   
Adversaries armed with ballistic or cruise missiles could use these systems to 
deliver BW.  They could delay or deny U.S. access to a theater of operations causing U.S. 
NSF to fail to accomplish their mission.38  In December 2000, Global Trends 2015 noted 
that “the continuing diffusion of bio-technology will be the crest of the wave,” and goes 
on to state that the United States will face “strategic WMD threats…and the potential for 
unconventional delivery of BW by both state and non-state actors also will grow.”39    
                                                 
34  Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, “Deterrence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
Environment,” (Washington, D.C.:  National Defense University Press, 1999), 1.   
35   Ibid., 4. 
36   Ibid.  
37   Sam J. Tangredi, “The Future Security Environment, 2001-2025:  Toward a Consensus View,” in Michele A. 
Flournoy, ed., QDR 2001 Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, (Washington, D.C.:  National Defense University 
Press, 2001), 34-35. 
38   Michele A. Flournoy, “Introduction:  Twelve Strategy Decisions,” in Michele A. Flournoy, ed., QDR 2001 
Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, (Washington, D.C.:  National Defense University Press, 2001), 12.  
39   Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015:  A Dialogue with Non-
Government Experts, (Washington, D.C.:  National Foreign Intelligence Board), NIC Report No. 2000-02, (December 2000).  
Available at: http://www.cia.gov/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html - link.9b. 
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Given uncertainties in regard to science and technology, the report stated that the 
“rapid advances and diffusion of bio-technology, nano-technology, and the material 
sciences, will add to adversaries’ capabilities to engage in BW and bio-terrorism.”40  To 
counter this BW trend the U.S. Navy will need to enhance its operational concepts or face 
constraints to its ability to project U.S. national interests.41    
The BW threat relies on deterrence and deniability and is based on the fear that 
biological agents could create large numbers of casualties.  The question is, what 
operational concepts will the U.S. Navy use to counter the threat and how will it get 
there?  American dominance of sea and air is largely irrelevant in dealing with the more 
likely future threat of BW from state and non-state actors, as well as against the prepared 
anti-access or area denial strategies of regional opponents.42   
The Biological and Toxins Agreement disallows states to possess and weaponize 
biological agents?  How do states get away with it?  And, what can U.S. NSF do to 
counter BW proliferator’s capabilities?  The weaponization and delivery of BW agents 
entails field-testing of biological aerosols, munitions, and delivery systems, as well as 
troop exercises and could be conceded or carried out at night or under the cover of 
legitimate dual-use activities by both state and non-state actors.43   
The United States and most allies cannot respond in kind if BW were used, and 
adversaries are well aware of this fact.44  Actors seeking BW capabilities likely will 
begin with the development of standard agents that have previously been weaponized 
such as anthrax, tularemia, and botulinum toxin.45  Possible delivery systems range in 
complexity and effectiveness from an agricultural sprayer to specialized cluster warheads 
                                                 
40   Ibid. 
41   Elizabeth Kier and Jonathan Mercer, “Setting Precedents in Anarchy:  Military Intervention and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), 77-106.  The authors argue that setting precedent may be 
particularly important in today’s post cold war environment where the rules of the road are under negotiation.  For further 
discussion on international reputations see Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca:  Cornell University 
Press, 1996). 
42   In the logic of the anti-access approach, a potential opponent would not seek to engage the Navy at sea, where the 
United States holds absolute dominance.  Rather, it would seek to prevent U.S. NSF from entering its littoral waters by 
massive attrition attacks using biological weapons.   
43   OTA, Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation, in Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 76. 
44  Barry R. Schneider, Future War and Counter Proliferation:  U.S. Responses to NBC Proliferation, (Westport:  
Praeger Publishing, 1999), 70. 
45  OTA, Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation, in Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 84.  
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carried on a ballistic missile.46  Ultimately the political question of BW proliferation 
becomes a political and diplomatic issue beyond the scope of this research. 
This chapter ties state and non-state actors directly to means for maximizing the 
BW threat to NSF and capabilities for their delivery.  Incentives and disincentives are 
contrasted with countries capabilities for BW production of different types of biological 
agents to illustrate how actors might thwart U.S. NSF ability to project power.       
B. WORLD ACTORS (CASE ASSESSMENTS)  
It is estimated that more than 100 countries have the capacity, if not the intent, to 
develop at least crude BW based on standard microbial and toxin agents; in addition to 
the United States, Russia, Western Europe, and Japan, countries with an advanced 
biotechnology infrastructure include, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, India, Israel, China, 
Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, North Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.47 
1. State Actors and Threat Environments 
The devastation that could be caused by use of BW agents is suggested by the fact 
that throughout history, the inadvertent spread of infectious disease during wartime has 
caused far more casualties than actual combat.48  Even though BW arouses general 
repugnance, has never been conducted on a large scale, and is banned by an international 
treaty, BW agents were stockpiled during both the Great War and the Second World War 
and continue to be developed as strategic weapons—“the poor man’s atomic bomb’’—by 
a growing number of countries.49   
Evidence suggests that states are acquiring BW for multiple reasons.  Incentives 
and disincentives acting in combination have the net effect of motivating countries to 
seek an offensive BW program, or to refrain from doing so.  States suspected of having 
ongoing BW programs are clustered in two conflict-ridden regions of the world.  Six are 
located in North Africa and the Middle East (Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Libya, and Syria), 
and another five are concentrated in East Asia (Burma, China, North Korea, South Korea, 
                                                 
46   Ibid., 94. 
47   Raymond A. Zilinska, “Biological Warfare and the World” Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 1, (August 
1990), 61.  Also see Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas Welch, “Testimony before the U.S. Congress” reported in 
Defense Week (May 1998).  
48   John P. Heggers, “Microbial Invasion-The Major Ally of War (Natural Biological Warfare),” Military Medicine, 
Vol. 143, No. 6, (June 1978), 390-394. 
49   For a more detailed discussion of terrorism, see OTA, U.S. Congress, Technology Against Terrorism, (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. GPO, July 1991), 21-22.  See also Jessica Eve Stem, “Will Terrorists Turn  to Poison?” Orbis, Vol. 37, No. 3, 
(Summer 1993). 
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and Taiwan).  Other alleged BW proliferators include Russia, which may not have fully 
eliminated the vast program inherited from Soviet Union, and South Africa, which during 
the Apartheid era had an active BW program that was reportedly dismantled in 1993.50  
Cuba, India, Laos, Pakistan, and Vietnam also appear on some lists of suspected BW 
proliferators.51 
What are the primary motivations for state actors acquiring BW?  According to 
Jonathan B. Tucker, the veil of secrecy surrounding BW programs suggests that BW do 
not have the same prestige value as nuclear weapons.  This suggests that the decision to 
acquire a BW capability is often based on the perception of an acute security threat, 
accompanied by a deficit in the ability of the state to counter that threat with conventional 
weapons.52  Security-related incentives and disincentives for the acquisition of BW are 
summarized in Table 2.1.   
The list of suspected BW proliferators can be divided into two general categories 
based on the technical and financial resources at their disposal. More developed states, 
such as China, Russia, Iran, and Iraq, have pursued the full panoply of WMD, with a 
primary emphasis on nuclear arms.  In contrast, less-developed states such as Libya, for 
whom the nuclear option remains technically and financially inaccessible, have focused 
their efforts on the acquisition of BW.53  Countries that seek nuclear weapons also may 
pursue BW as an interim strategic deterrent until they can build and deploy secure 
nuclear forces.  An apparent paradox concerning the value of BW for deterrence is that 
countries generally do not admit to possessing them. 
                                                 
50   P. Taylor, “Toxic South African Arms Raise Concern,” Washington Post, (28 February 1995), A-14.  In Zilinskas, 
“Biological Warfare and the World,” 27. 
51   OTA, Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation, in Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 82; J. M. Collins, Z. S. Davis, and S. R. Bowman, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapon Proliferation:  
Potential Military Countermeasures,  (Washington, D.C.:  Congressional Research Service, Report No. 1994-528S, 1994), 2; 
W. S. Carus.  “The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb?”  “Biological Weapons in the Middle East,” Policy Paper No. 23, 
(Washington, D.C.:  Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991) in Raymond A. Zilinskas, Biological Warfare:  Modern 
Offense and Defense, (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).  
52   Jonathan B. Tucker, “Motivations For and Against Proliferation:  The Case of the Middle East” in Zilinskas, 
Biological Warfare:  Modern Offense and Defense, 27-52. 
53   Tucker, “Motivations For and Against Proliferation:  The Case of the Middle East” in Zilinskas, Biological 
Warfare:  Modern Offense and Defense, 29-30. 
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Incentives 
1. To deter chemical, biological, or nuclear attack by regional or extraregional powers 
2. As a force-multiplier against regional or extraregional powers possessing superior 
conventional capabilities (e.g. U.S. capabilities) 
3. To achieve regional hegemony by intimidating neighboring states 
4. As a tactical weapon for battlefield use 
5. For covert warfare or economic sabotage against enemy states 
6. For State-supported terrorism 
7. For Counterinsurgency warfare against internal groups 
8. For assassination and harassment of political opponents 
 
Disincentives 
1. Absence of a perceived security deficit or the existence of a credible security guarantee 
2. Limited deterrent value compared with nuclear arms or the perception that BW lacks 
military utility 
3. Risk of provoking offsetting weapons programs by other states or presumptive military 
action 
4. Security problems associated with maintaining a BW capability 
5. International norms against acquisition and use 
6. Global and regional arms control regimes, if backed up with political or economic 
sanctions 
7. Availability of effective defenses 
8. Opportunity costs and resources trade offs with conventional arms 
 
 
Table 2.1. Security Incentives and Disincentives for Acquiring Biological 
Weapons.54 
 
How long will U.S. NSF strength remain superior to undeveloped countries 
possessing BW?  Some developing countries, having learned the lessons of Iraq’s defeat 
in the 1991 Gulf War and Serbia’s debacle in Kosovo in 1999, may pursue an asymmetric 
strategy in which they seek to pit their strengths against the vulnerabilities of advanced 
industrialized states that are superior in conventional military power.55   
                                                 
54   Ibid., 30.  
55   Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars:  A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International Security, Vol. 
26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), 93-128.   
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Since BW can inflict mass casualties yet are far cheaper than conventional bombs 
and delivery systems, they offer potential means for poor countries to offset the 
advantage provided by high-technology conventional weapons.  The goal of this strategy 
would be to deter outside intervention altogether or to prevent the stronger side from 
bringing to bear the full weight of its conventional military power.56 




     Iraq produced and weaponized significant quantities of BW agents prior to the 
1991 Gulf War.  While it admitted BW efforts in 1995, it claimed to have 
destroyed all agents, but offered no credible proof and may have begun program 
reconstitution in absence of UN inspections and monitoring.   
 
North Korea 
     North Korea has pursued BW capabilities since the 1960s and possesses the 
infrastructure that can be used to produce BW agents.  It may already have BW 
available for use.   
 
China 
     China possesses the necessary capability and infrastructure adequate to 
develop and produce BW agents.  It reaffirmed commitments not to develop BW, 
but likely retains some elements of an offensive program.   
 
Russia 
     Russia may have many elements of its FSU BW program still intact and could 
support future agent production.  Some offensive BW activities may still be 




     Iran possesses the overall infrastructure and expertise to support a BW 
program.  It pursues contracts with Russian agencies and other sources to acquire 
dual-use equipment and technology and is believed to be actively pursuing 
offensive BW capabilities to thwart Iraqi aggression and regional tensions, and 
may even currently possess small levels of usable agent.   
 
Syria 
     Syria possesses an adequate bio-technical infrastructure to support a limited 
BW program and is probably pursuing biological agent development, but is not 
believed to have a major agent production effort underway.   
 
Libya 
     Libya remains in the research and development stage, but may be capable of 
producing small quantities of agent in the near future.   
 
India 
     India has a substantial bio-technical infrastructure and the necessary expertise, 
some of which is assumed  as being used for BW defense research. 
 
Pakistan 
     Pakistan is believed to possess the capability to support a limited BW research 
effort.  
 
Table 2.2. Selected Countries BW Capabilities.57 
 
2. Non-State Actors 
How can U.S. NSF counter BW threats from non-state actors?  The non-state 
asymmetric strategy is difficult to anticipate.  The United States normally considers other 
states as potential enemies, however, given the wide distribution of technology and 
                                                 
56   Tucker, “Motivations For and Against Proliferation:  The Case of the Middle East” in Zilinskas, Biological 
Warfare:  Modern Offense and Defense, 31. 
57   Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), 2001 in United States Government (USG), The Worldwide Biological 
Warfare Threat (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. GPO), 2.  
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knowledge, and the capabilities of well-honed terrorist and smuggling organizations, 
future adversaries may not be other states at all.   
Troublesome questions arise:  Can a state declare war against a non-state?  What 
if the non-state actor is sheltered within the territory of a state? 58  The war on terrorism 
waged against the Taliban and other Al Queada organizations in Afghanistan beginning 
in October 2001 is an example of this problem.  The rise of sophisticated, powerful, and 
hostile non-state actors suggests that finding answers to these questions should become 
paramount to national priority.59  
Should the U.S. Navy concentrate solely on “state actors”?  How could a non-
state actor compete with superior military forces?  The Director of Central Intelligence in 
February 2001 said that “[T]errorists groups are actively searching the internet to acquire 
information and capabilities for chemical and biological attacks.  Many of the 29 
officially designated terrorists organizations have an interest in unconventional weapons, 
and Usama bin Laden in 1998 even declared their acquisition ‘a religious duty’.”60   
The consensus is that non-state threats will increase in number and intensity in the 
future.61  Non-state threats may seem more potent due to the advantages modern 
technologies may bring to the perpetrator.  The same technologies can be used; however, 
to strengthen defenses.  But this will not solve the immediate problem of terrorism, 
particularly if terrorist groups obtain WMD.   
There is concern about near-term potential for incidents, but the level of current 
and future vulnerability of NSF using BW is still hotly debated.  No sources maintain that 
non-state threats will not increase in the 2001-2025 timeframe, but some sources do view 
the rise of these threats as exponential rather than gradual, with more alarm than the 
                                                 
58   Newport Paper No. 13 – Part One, “Where we Are, and Whither we are Tending…,” 1998. 
59   Ibid. 
60   Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, Worldwide Threat 2001:  National Security in a Changing World, 
testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, (7 February 2001).  Available at:  http://www.cia.gov/. 
61   National Intelligence Council Chairman John C. Gannon, remarks at the Hoover Institute Conference on Biological 
and Chemical Weapons, (1999).  He stated, “the BW threat is real and growing, the number of potential perpetrators is 
increasing, particularly non-state actors, agents of increasing lethality are being developed, and that the Intelligence 
Community alone cannot eliminate this threat, nor can any other single institution or sector.”  Available at:  http://www-
hoover.stanford.edu/research/conferences/bcw/gannon1.html. 
18 
consensus view might imply.  Of particular concern, is the possibility of terrorism by 
non-state actors with BW capabilities, also known as catastrophic terrorism.62 
C. TYPES OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS 
Although BW often is grouped together with chemical weapons (CW), they differ 
in important ways.  CW agents are man-made, non-living poisons, biological agents are 
infectious microorganisms that reproduce with the host to cause an incapacitating or fatal 
illness.  Small quantities of a biological agent – if widely disseminated through the air – 
could inflict casualties over a large area.  Weight for weight, BW agents are hundreds to 
thousands of times more potent than the most lethal CW agents, making them the true 
WMD with a potential for lethal mayhem that can exceed that of nuclear weapons.63   
Biological agents are infectious microorganisms that generally fall into three 
categories; bacteria, viruses, and biological toxins.  They reproduce within the host to 
cause an incapacitating or fatal illness.  Poisonous chemicals manufactured by living 
organisms, toxins have characteristics of both chemical and biological agents.  Because 
of the ability of pathogenic microorganisms to multiply rapidly within the host, small 
quantities of a biological agent, if widely disseminated, could inflict casualties over a 
very large area.64 
BW developed for military use can infect reliably in small doses.  It also has a 
high capacity to cause acute illness resulting in incapacitation or death (see Figure 2.1).  
It has a limited loss of potency during production, storage, and transport; a short 
incubation period between infection and onset of symptoms, and an insusceptibility to 
common medical treatments.  It is easy to transport, and is stable under wartime field 
conditions of storage and delivery.  It is easy to disseminate and can survive 
environmental stresses during dissemination (e.g. heat, sunlight, desiccation, and shear 
                                                 
 
62   Sam J. Tangredi, “The Future Security Environment, 2001-2025:  Toward a Consensus View,” in Michele A. 
Flournoy, ed., QDR 2001 Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, (Washington, D.C.:  National Defense University 
Press, 2001), 34. 
63   OTA, Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation, in Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 73. 
64   Office of Technology Assessment [OTA], U.S. Congress.  Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation, 
in Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. 
GPO], 1993), 73. 
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force) long enough to infect.  Attacking troops can also be protected against the agent 
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Figure 2.1. The Nominal Lethality of Different Biological Weapons (Numbers of 
Dead/Incapacitated from Delivery of 1,000 Kilograms).66 
 
Bacterial agents, viral agents, and biological toxins represent a small sample of 
the general categories and characteristics of agents that are of current concern.  
Additional information on key biological agents can be found in Table 2.3. 
 
                                                 
65   Ibid., 77. 
66   Ibid., 100. 
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Disease Infectivity Transmissibility Incubation Mortality Therapy 
Period 
      
Viral      
Chikungunya 
Fever 
High? None 2-6 days Very low (-1%) None 
Dengue fever  High None 2-5 days Very low (-1%) None 
Eastern Equine      
Encephalitis 
(EEE) 
High None 5-10 days High (+60%) Developmental 
Tick Borne      
Encephalitis High None 1-2 weeks Up to 30% Developmental 
VEE High None 2-5 days Low (-1%) Developmental 
Hepatitis A -  - 15-40 days - - 
Hepatitis B - - 40-150 days -   - 
Influenza High None 1-3 days Usually low Available 
Yellow Fever High None 3-6 days Up to 40% Available 
Smallpox 
(Variola) 
High High 7-16 days Up to 30% Available 
      
Rickettsial      
Coxiella 
Burneti 
     
(Q-fever) High Negligible 10-21 day Low (-1%) Antibiotic 




     
spotted fever)  High None 3-10 days Up to 80% Antibiotic 
Epidemic 
typhus 
High None 6-15 days Up to 70% Antibiotic 
      
Bacterial      
Anthrax 
(pulmonary) 
Mod-high Negligible 1-5 days Usually fatal Antibiotic/vaccine 
Brucellosis High None 1-3 days -25% Antibiotic 
Cholera Low High  1-5 days Up to 80%  Antibiotic/vaccine 
Glanders High None 1-2 days Usually fatal Antibiotic 
Meloidosis High None 1-5 days Usually fatal Antibiotic 
Plague      
(pneumonic) High High 2-5 days Usually fatal Antibiotic/vaccine 
Tularemia High Negligible 1-10 days Low to 60% Antibiotic/vaccine 
Typhoid Fever Mod-high Mod-high 7-21 days Up to 10% Antibiotic/vaccine 
Dysentery High High 1-4 days Low to high Antibiotic/vaccine 
      
Toxins      
Botulinum 
Toxin 
High None 12-72 hrs High Vaccine 
Mycotoxin High None Hours/days Low to high ? 
Staphylococcus Moderate None 24-48 hrs Incapacitating ? 
 
Table 2.3. Key Biological Agents that Could be Used.67 
 
 
                                                 
67   United Nations Department of Political and Security Affairs, Report of the Secretary General, Department of 
Political and Security Affairs, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use, 
(New York:  United Nations, 1969, 26, 29, 37-52, 116-117; Jane's NBC Protection Equipment, 1991-1992; James Smith, 
“Biological Warfare Developments,” Jane's Intelligence Review (November 1991), 483-487. 
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1. Bacterial and Rickettsiae Agents 
Bacterial agents are single-celled microscopic organisms that include anthrax, 
plague, tularemia, Q-fever and Brucellosis.  Bacterial agents can be transformed into 
spores; the spore is more resistant to cold, heat, drying radiation and chemicals than the 




Anthrax is a zoonotic disease with cattle, horses, and sheep 
being the chief hosts.  The disease spores are very stable and may be 
viable for years in soil and water.  When stabilized for weaponization, 
it can be delivered as an aerosol cloud or it can be spread from a point 
source through a spray device.  The hardy anthrax spore can survive 
explosive dissemination from a bomb or shell and a large area could 
be covered by dispersal of multiple spray bomblets from a missile 
warhead.  Following an incubation period of one to six days, 
presumably dependent upon the dose of inhaled anthrax spores, a 
fever, malaise, and fatigue may be present, followed by a period of 
improvement ranging from hours to days.  Following is the abrupt 
development of severe respiratory distress; shock and death within 
twenty-four to thirty-six hours.68 
Tularemia, also know as rabbit fever and deer fly fever, is 
also a zoonotic disease that humans acquire through inoculation of 
skin, or mucous membranes with blood or tissue fluids of infected 
animals, bites, infected deer flies, or mosquitoes (referred to as 
“vectors”) and ticks.  It occurs after inhalation of infectious aerosols.  
Pneumonia is most common with the typhoidal form of tularemia.  
After an incubation period of two to ten days, Ulceroglandular disease 
usually manifests as regional lymphadenopathy, fever, chills, 
headaches, and malaise.  This agent can be weaponized in either wet 
or dry form and can be delivered in a manner similar as that described 
for anthrax.  
Rickettsiae are microorganisms that resemble bacteria in 
form and structure but differ in that they are intracellular parasites that 
can only reproduce inside animal cells.  Examples include Rock 
Mountain spotted fever, Tsutsugamuchi disease, and Q-fever.  Used in 
BW agents, Rickettsiae would likely be disseminated directly through 
the air.69  
 
Table 2.4. Bacterial and Rickettsiae Agents. 
 
2. Viral Agents 
Viral agents are extremely small submicroscopic agents (100 times smaller than 
bacteria) containing genetic material that consist of a strand of genetic material (either 
RNA or DNA), surrounded by a protective coat that facilitates transmission from one cell 
to another (see Table 2.5). 
                                                 
68   Ibid., 78-79. 




Examples include Smallpox, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE) 
and Viral Hemorrhagic fevers. Viruses lack a system for their own 
metabolism and are dependent on host cells:  viruses are intercellular 
parasites which means that a virus requires living cells in order to multiply.  
Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (or VEE) is characterized by 
inflammation of the meninges of the brain and of the brain itself.  This 
disease is of short duration and the fatality rate is less than one percent.  
Onset of VEE is usually sudden after an incubation period of one to five 
days.  A spiking fever, general malaise, vomiting, cough, sore throat and 
diarrhea, lasting twenty-four to seventy-two hours.  It can be weaponized in 
either wet or dry form and is employed in the same manner as anthrax.  
Smallpox and other viruses that cause hemorrhagic manifestations fall into 
this category as well.70 
 
Table 2.5. Viral Agents. 
 
3. Biological Toxins 
Biological toxins, contrasted to man-made toxins in chemical agents, are products 
of living organisms that produce adverse clinical effects in human beings via three 
different routes of exposure, injection, ingestion, and inhalation (see Table 2.6).   
 
Biological Toxins 
This is a group of seven related neurotoxins, “A” through “G”, 
produced by the bacillus clostridium botulinum.  When inhaled, they 
produce a clinical picture similar to food-borne intoxication and could 
be dispersed by aerosol over amphibious troop concentrations to cause 
mass sickness and inability to execute operational requirements. The 
clinical syndrome produced is known as “botulism”.   
From a chemical standpoint, there are two categories of toxins: 
protein toxins, and non-protein toxins.  Botulinum toxin is one of the 
most toxic compounds know to man, requiring only 0.001 microgram 
per kilogram of body weight to kill; 15,000 times more toxic than VX 
and 100,000 times greater than sarin, two well known chemical agents.  
Compared to microbial pathogens, toxins offer the following tactical 
advantages:  toxins are so small that easily transported quantities would 
be militarily significant; toxins deteriorate rapidly once released into the 
environment; and they are well suited for covert warfare…leaving no 
traces providing little evidence of military use for retaliation.71  
 
Table 2.6. Biological Toxins. 
 
D. DELIVERY SYSTEMS 
It is not enough to mass-produce BW agents.  Agents must first be formulated to 
enhance dissemination efficiency, and then must be incorporated into a satisfactory 
delivery system.  Depending upon the adversary’s desired effect, a BW attack can come 
                                                 
70   Ibid., 80-81. 
71   Ibid., 82. 
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in numerous forms.72  BW agents can be delivered in either a liquid or dry powder form.  
Dry agents are more stable during storage and shipping and are more suited to 
widespread dissemination.   
A biological agent is of little military utility if it does not produce consistent and 
reliable effects and cannot be delivered to a target.  BW agents are all nonvolatile solids 
that would be disseminated either as a liquid slurry or dry powder of freeze-dried 
organisms or toxins.73  It is not hard to spread BW agents in an indiscriminate way for the 
purpose of producing large numbers of casualties over a wide area, it requires much more 
dedication, however, to develop BW munitions that have predictable and controllable 
military effects against point targets.74   
A primary challenge in weaponizing BW agents is long-range delivery.  The 
challenge is to keep the agents alive long enough to infect humans.  It requires the agent 
to be capable of withstanding the physical stresses involved in the dissemination process 
without losing activity.   
The particle size of an aerosol is critical to both its atmospheric stability and its 
military effectiveness.  Whereas larger particles tend to settle out of the air, microscopic 
particles between one and five microns in diameter form a stable aerosol in which the 
particles remain airborne.  Such a cloud could then be transported by the wind over long 
distances.  Moreover, particle losses resulting from fallout and washout are negligible and 
do not significantly reduce the concentration of an aerosol cloud.75    
1. Point Attack Versus Area Attack 
There are two types of aerosol dissemination of BW agents.  Area attack and 
point attack.  Area attack involves releasing an aerosol cloud upwind and allowing it to 
                                                 
72   OTA, Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation, in Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 91-96.  Delivery systems range in complexity and effectiveness from agricultural sprayers mounted on a truck, to 
a specialized cluster warhead carried on a ballistic missile.  Regardless of the method, the attack can generate a cloud of 
aerosol particles small enough to allow them to be inhaled deep into the lungs.  
73   The disease vector is usually some type of arthropod:  mosquitoes transmit yellow fever and dengue fever, fleas 
transmit plague; and ticks transmit tularemia and Q fever.  During 1932-45, the Japanese BW facility known as Unit 731 set 
up flea “nurseries” for the production of 135 million plague-infested fleas every four months.  As a delivery system, porcelain 
bombs were developed that could contain about 30,000 infected fleas.  See Williams and Wallace, op. Citational, footnote 35, 
27. 
74   OTA, Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation, in Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 94. 
75   Ibid., 96.  Aerosolized BW agents generally do not penetrate the skin and thus do not represent a significant contact 
hazard; instead, they infect individuals when inhaled into the lungs.  Additionally, large particle clouds are “more resistant” to 
the lethal effects of solar radiation than small particles, but small particles are best suited for “long range” attacks. 
24 
drift over the target area.  In contrast, point attack involves projecting the agent in a 
canister that releases the agent immediately over the target.  An example of an area attack 
might be an aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicle flying upwind of intended targets, over 
the top of ships – inport or underway – or amphibious landing forces, or it can be spread 
from a point source through a spray device.76   
A BW designed for area attack would disseminate its payload as an aerosol cloud 
containing a sufficient concentration of microorganisms to infect the targeted personnel 
with particles in the one to five micron range.  Area attack depends heavily upon 
atmospheric diffusion and wind currents to dilute and spread the agent over the intended 
area being attacked.77   
BW agents are disseminated from a munition using either explosive or 
pressurized methods.  Whereas explosive dissemination produces an almost instantaneous 
build-up of aerosol concentration over the target, it destroys a large portion of the 
infectious agents and tends to produce drops that are considerably larger than the optimal 
droplet size for inhalation.  In contrast, pressurized munitions do not disperse agent as 
rapidly as explosive munitions but provide better control of particle size, are gentler on 
the microorganisms, and produce an aerosol cloud that is visible for a shorter period of 
time.78   
A BW (bomb or warhead) may be filled with bulk agent or with numerous self-
dispensing cluster-bomb units (CBUs).  A cluster bomb has a casing that breaks open 
during delivery to “scatter” a large number of smaller sub-munitions over a wide area.  
The sub-munitions then are triggered to go off at an altitude of about fifteen to twenty 
                                                 
76  Biological agents can be delivered by various means including, but not limited to, theater ballistic missiles, aerial 
bombs, artillery shells, mines, spraying devices, hand grenades, low slow flying aircraft, or direct application from ground 
based aerosol generators, and can be used on the battlefield by state actors, or by non-state actors including terrorists, against 
military forces both at sea and during inport operations. In his 1995 report to congress, John M. Collins, a senior defense 
specialist at the Congressional Research Service, argued that regional aggressors could apply BW to great advantage.  “Results 
would be devastating,” said Collins, “if they immobilize activities at sea ports, international airfields and supply depots so the 
United States could neither introduce forces into the theater rapidly nor adequately sustain U.S. ships, and forces already in 
place.”    
77   OTA, Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation, in Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 97.  This phenomenon, called inversion, is ideal for the delivery of BW because the stable interface of warm and 
cold air prevents the vertical mixing of the cloud and causes it to hug the ground.  The most stable atmospheric conditions 
occur on cold, clear nights or early in the morning, when the ground and the layer of air above it are cooler then the next 
higher layer of air.   
78  Ibid. 
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feet off the ground.  Each bomblet generates a small aerosol cloud; these multiple point 
sources are then coalesced by air currents into a single large cloud.79   
2. Possible Attack Scenarios 
There is a literal panacea of environments that NSF might find themselves and 
several different states of potential warfare and unit readiness.  They routinely may be 
operating on the high seas, they might be pier-side in foreign ports, conducting operations 
in Littoral Warfare Zones (LWZ), or pier-side in the continental United States (CONUS).  
They also could be immersed in a full-scale combat zone with joint operations occurring 
all around them.  In each environment they will be required to manifest different types of 
responses to different types of threats.  They will require different TTPs and doctrine to 
fight, survive, and prevail. 
Given U.S. Navy overwhelming conventional superiority on the high seas, and 
existing Force Protection programs for naval assets conducting operations or while pier-
side within CONUS, the most critical BW threat to U.S. NSF would likely be either 
conducting inport operations in foreign ports or operations in LWZs.80    
The question is not whether attacks on American forces will take place in the 
future, but when and where.  The terrorist attack on USS COLE (DDG-67) highlighted 
the constant dangers confronting U.S. armed forces.81  Being readily identifiable symbols 
of the United States, American forces are attractive targets.  The Navy should invoke the 
Navy-after-Next warfare requirements and prepare now through development of crucial 
doctrine and tactics to counter BW.  
E. CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter is dedicated to defining BW threats to U.S. NSF and provides a 
summary assessment of the most likely state and non-state actors, and their possible 
motivations for use of BW.  The emphasis centered on identifying types of BW agents, 
followed by a discussion of the delivery methods and possible scenarios for BW strikes.   
BW is perceived to be attractive to adversarial states and non-state actors for a 
variety of reasons.  Insofar as states are concerned, BW provides a means of waging                                                  
79   Ibid., 98-99. 
80   Thomas W. Murrey, Jr., “Who’s Responsible:  Understanding Force Protection,” in Joint Force Quarterly:  A 
Professional Military Journal, No. 22 (Summer 1999), 105-108. 
81   Editor in Chief Dick Cole, “USS COLE:  Where do we go from here?” in Surface Warfare, Vol. 26, No. 1 
(January/February 2001), 6-12.  Available at:  http://surfacewarfare.nswc.navy.mil/. 
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asymmetric warfare against an adversary with superior military capabilities.  Biological 
agents are easy to acquire because they occur in nature, yet the effects of BW can be 
comparable to those of nuclear weapons.  As for non-state actors, the attraction of BW is 
far less evident as the skills necessary to produce and disperse biological agents in an 
effective way are non-trivial.  In contrast to the use of high explosives where the effect is 
instantaneous and the consequences highly predictable, a biological agent will have a 
delayed effect.  The consequences of the BW will depend on the precise meteorological 
conditions at the instant of release, where and how the agent is dispersed, and whether it 
reaches the intended target.82  
The use of BW against theater-level targets offers the most lucrative employment 
option of all forms of WMD use.83  Given current TTPs and doctrine for countering BW 
attacks, U.S. NSF would have great difficulty in retaliating for a BW attack or incident.  
BW can give the user a potential strategic advantage.  The threat or use of anthrax, 
tularemia, or VEE, for example, against a theater aerial or surface port of debarkation 
could have a crippling effect on the flow of U.S. forces into the theater, which could be 
magnified in “surge” situations.84   
 
 
                                                 
82   Graham S. Pearson, “Why Biological Weapons Present the Greatest Danger,” paper delivered at the Seventh 
International Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Stockholm (15-19 June 2001).  
Pearson previously was the Director-General and Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, 
Porton Down, UK. 
83   Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., “The Rise of Asymmetric Threats:  Priorities for Defense Planning,” in Michele A. 
Flournoy, ed., QDR 2001 Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, (Washington, D.C.:  National Defense University 
Press, 2001), 84.  
84   Ibid., They also have the added advantage over nuclear weapons for the attacker because it would be substantially 
more difficult for the United States to trace sponsorship on an attack in order to mount retaliation efforts. 
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III. FLEET BIO-DEFENSE DETECTION CAPABILITIES  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Better understanding of the Biological Warfare (BW) threat by the U.S. Navy is 
essential to establish key competencies to counter its effects.  The current risks 
shouldered by NSF Commanding Officers (COs) and Officers in Tactical Command 
(OTCs) make it particularly important that the U.S. Navy employ concepts that can be 
engineered into naval doctrine and operational TTPs, and further translated into Local 
Unit Practices (LPs).      
The BW threat is widely addressed by OSD and among the Services and CINCs.  
In his report, "Biological Weapons in Major Theater War," Brad Roberts states, “[I]t is 
still common for senior leaders and decision-makers to cast BW as an emerging threat 
whose impact will be felt only five to ten years hence; widespread recognition of the BW 
threat has generated a broad range of activities to improve the ability of U.S. forces to 
fight and survive in a BW environment.” Yet the full spectrum of requirements associated 
with successfully defeating a well-armed BW aggressor remains poorly understood 
among military planners and operators.85   
There are numerous ways for BW to be used against U.S. NSF in a Major Theater 
War (MTW).  An aggressor is likely to perceive many lucrative targets for BW attack, 
including forces in theater and forces enroute to the theater, targets of campaign 
significance such as air and seaports of debarkation and embarkation, host nation support 
assets, and high value point targets.  Delivery systems may run the gamut.  Some modes 
of use are aimed principally at gaining an operational advantage, while others are aimed 
at generating fear to extract a political concession.86   
B. U.S. NAVY BW EXECUTIVE AGENT 
Realization that BW threats to U.S. NSF exist has prompted the U.S. Navy to 
reevaluate its primary tenets regarding oversight of BW defense.  The threat is typically 
seen as having relatively low priority, compared to conventional, CW, and nuclear 
                                                 
85   Brad Roberts,  “Biological Weapons in Major Theater War,” (Washington, D.C.:  Institute for Defense Analysis 
[IDA], November 1998), S-1-S-2. 
86   Ibid.  
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threats, when in fact BW programs are proliferating and are located in every region 
where MTW is a possibility.87   
The CNO Executive Agent for CB Defense, Deputy Secretary of the Navy for 
Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments (OPNAV N7) has been instrumental 
in ushering in new interest in the threat and means for combating BW (See Figure 3.1).  
As part of its responsibility, it has shared in comprehensive DoD approaches to 
combating this threat.   
Fleet Battle Experiments (FBE), wargaming, fleet operations, and restructured 
approaches to aligning the “planner” and “executive” as partners in the assessment of 
threats and emerging force requirements are ways to combat the BW problem.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 U.S Navy Executive Agent for CB Defense (N70CP).88 
                                                 
87   Roberts, “Biological Weapons in Major Theater War.”  The use of offensive BW is typically seen as “another 
version of getting slimed, only worse,” when in fact the modes and effects of BW use are likely to be distinctive.  BW defense 
is typically seen as comprising CW protection plus vaccination, when in fact a defense-in-depth consisting of both active and 
passive defenses, counter-force capabilities, medical counter-measures, and other elements is necessary. 
88   Joint Publication 3-11.  Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense, 10 July 1995. 
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With the establishment of the Counter Proliferation (N70CP) component of the 
Warfare Integration and Assessment (N70) Branch, the U.S. Navy has taken important 
steps to institutionalize experts in the field of counter-proliferation (CP) and BW defense. 
The mission of N70CP is to: 
• Evaluate and assess potential threats against the force  
• Identify and counter aggressors who possess BW capabilities  
• Provide for emerging technologies and new processes against viable 
threats 
• Streamline doctrinal processes that will allow for establishment of 
comprehensive TTP and LPs fleet-wide 
• Take a “long view” at training strengths and weaknesses and assess the 
magnitude of its proprieties against realistic needs89 
C. PROTECTING THE FORCE 
1. Fleet Battle Experiments/Limited Objective Experiments 
The Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) in partnership with the 
Numbered Fleet commanders designs and executes the Fleet Battle Experiment (FBE) 
Program as part of the process for collecting and assessing warfighting innovations.90  
Recent experiments included Biological and Chemical Defense initiatives:  FBE-
Echo, conducted with THIRD Fleet in March of 1999, FBE-Foxtrot, with FIFTH Fleet in 
December of 1999, Biological Warfare Defense, Limited Objective Experiment (LOE) 
with FIFTH Fleet in March of 2000, and FBE-Hotel, conducted with SECOND Fleet in 
September 2000.91     
These initiatives included the development of an NBC Defense Battle 
Management Cell to perform several functions in support of the Naval Component 
Command/Joint Task Force Command (JTFC) including, readiness and vulnerability 
assessments, disaster oversight planning, tactical control of defense forces, sensors, local 
                                                 
89   Peter Schwartz, “The Art of the Long View,” (Washington, D.C.:  Doubleday Bell, 1991), 3-10, 105-123.   
90  Department of Defense [DoD] Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Annual Report to Congress and 
Performance Plan, (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], July 2001), 95.  Publications under 
current revision include NWP 3-11 Multiservice NBC Operations, NTTP 3-11.24 Multiservice Tactics Techniques and 
Procedures for NBC Aspects of Consequence and NTTP 3-11.25 NBC Contamination Avoidance. Available at:  
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/chem_bio_def_program/2001_CBDP_Annual_Report.pdf. 
91   Ed McGrady and Robert Morrow, “Shipboard Biological Contamination Scenarios,” (Alexandria:  Center for Naval 
Analysis [CNA], June 2000). 
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forces and forces deployed for contingencies, warning and reporting, NBC event 
responses, and coordination of intra-theater support.92    
The first FBE-F scenario included a hoax event onboard an underway DDG-51 
Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer.  While underway, a sailor received a package in the mail.  
Upon opening it, a spring trap mechanism triggered a burst throwing biological agent 
(dust for the purpose of the experiment) in the air. The experiment analyzed the actions of 
the crew, the chain of command, and of the Battle Group Commander from that point 
forward.  Findings surrounded around the areas of shipboard detection, medical and 
psychosomatic symptoms (both simulated and real world), battle management, and the 
overall impact of the BW attack.93 
In a second scenario during LOE-00 dubbed Neon Falcon-00, a live agent threat 
was focused on NAVCENT, and contained to a surface ship.94  It focused on pressing the 
information collection and management capability of the battle management cell and the 
battle group commander to develop an understanding of the nature of the incident and 
relate it to the ongoing warfighting scenario (i.e. whether it was deliberate or accidental, 
and who was responsible).95  
While the full results are classified, shortfalls currently exist in BW defense.  
Chief among them is a lack of comprehensive TTPs that make operations transparent 
between units, and existing LPs effectively operationalized by U.S. NSF positioned in 
BW regions.  Another shortfall is the lack of comprehensive naval doctrine that stipulates 
commanders’ intention, objective, and permissives for responding to BW situations.  The 
general lack of permissives and doctrine ultimately leads to an assumption that NSF are 
not ready nor capable to sustain the mission in the face of BW attack or incident.   
                                                 
92   Gallup, Schacher, Sovereign, Irvine and Kimmel, FBE-Foxtrot Final Report  (Monterey:  Naval Postgraduate 
School, Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis [IJWA], April 2000).  92  FBE Foxtrot was conducted in Bahrain at Headquarters, 
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT) and Commander, FIFTH Fleet and included 
initiatives involving technology insertions for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) defense.   
93   Ibid. 
94   Unlike the hoax in FBE-F, the live agent threat in Neon Falcon simulated a real outbreak of an infectious biological 
agent to test the integration of medical and operational responses to a biological attack, provide the potential for a large-scale 
difficult consequence management operation focused on COMUSNAVCENT and regional naval forces, challenge the ability 
of the battle management cell to maintain and promulgate a coherent tactical picture of the emerging epidemic, and take 
appropriate countermeasures. 
95   McGrady and Morrow, “Shipboard Biological Contamination Scenarios,” 7-29.  
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Before doctrine, TTPs, or LPs can be operationalized, it is important to consider 
the means by which warriors would be certain that a BW attack is either, in progress, or 
has occurred.  A BW attack can take many forms, but the most likely representation 
would be in one form or another of aerosol cloud.  Since agents used in an attack must 
first be identified before CM and HSS actions can begin, the means for detecting BW 
release is critical.   
D. DETECTION AND PROTECTION 
Because NSF possess no long range BW detection capability, identifying a BW 
attack remains an important technical problem.96  A detection system should provide 
rapid, accurate detection and identification of BW agents.  Under battle conditions it is 
essential that a variety of samples be collected and tested via systems that provide 
immediate results with a low false alarm rate.97  In a traditional BW attack scenario, the 
agents are delivered as aerosols – the lethal “fluffy cloud.”  Concern therefore has usually 
focused on environmental detection, particularly of aerosolized agents.  In addition to the 
usual desiderata for most systems that will be used under battle conditions, there are a 
number of specific requirements for an ideal system.98   
In the “fluffy cloud” scenario, the concentration of organisms is likely to be fairly 
high, and therefore sensitivity may be less critical than specificity.  This requires the 
ability to distinguish pathogens from harmless organisms, for example, using as assay 
targets virulence factors or pathogen specific products, and to differentiate biologically 
active from nonviable organisms.99   
Time is of the essence.  The primary goal of detection is to provide sufficient 
warning of an attack to allow appropriate protective actions to be taken.  Because BW 
                                                 
96   Thomas C. Linn, “Adversarial Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Joint Force Quarterly:  A Professional 
Military Journal, No. 23 (Autumn/Winter 1999-2000), 58-64. 
97   Stephen S. Morse, “Detecting Biological Warfare Agents” in Raymond A. Zilinskas, Biological Warfare:  Modern 
Offense and Defense, (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner, 2000), 94.  The nature of potentially cross-reacting materials that could give 
false positives or that could interfere with the test for BW will also be different depending on the nature of the sample and its 
source. 
98   Systems should be rugged, easy to use by persons with minimal training, have high sensitivity to detect target 
agents at low concentration, and high specificity to identify accurately with few false positives. 
99   Morse, “Detecting Biological Warfare Agents,” 95.  Sample collection and preparation become especially 
troublesome in open-air environments.  Efficient, high-throughput aerosol sampling is necessary, current equipment is bulky 
requiring considerable power to operate, and require liquid samples that must be transferred into suitable liquid medium for 
testing.      
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attacks can come at any time, this usually translates into requirements for detectors that 
can operate automatically and unattended and that give results in near real time.  
Sampling and sample preparation are among the paramount issues because many 
of the samples are complex and are likely to have high backgrounds of interfering 
substances.  At present, several core assay technologies have been tested, but 
immunoassays, with a variety of possible detector formats for read-out, remain 
preeminent.100  Immunological or nucleic acid assays are extremely sensitive and 
specific, but completely blind to unknown agents. They also require a number of 
exhaustible reagents that cannot be regenerated in the field. Mass spectrometry, by 
contrast, requires signature recognition that can be confounded by mixtures.101 
1. Technologies 
The ratification resolution for the Biological Weapons Convention, states that 
U.S. Armed Forces are inadequately equipped, organized, trained and exercised for CB 
defense, and that too much reliance is placed on non-active duty forces which receive 
even less training and possess older equipment.102  A common thread in policy statements 
from senior American civilian and military leaders is the threat from the spread of WMD.  
A key DoD response to proliferation is a well-funded CB defense program set to deliver a 
number of new technologies to the U.S. Navy.103   
Growth of the CBDP has been substantial, with defense wide appropriations 
rising from $390 million in FY 1996 to $840 million in FY 2001.  Nearly 57 percent of 
FY 2001 appropriation is dedicated to procurement.  During the next five years, spending 
is expected to reach $1.1 billion, $400 million will go to R&D for developing protective 
equipment and vaccines, and $700 million will be spent purchasing new equipment.104 
                                                 
100   Morse, “Detecting Biological Warfare Agents,” 96.  Current sensors identify specific agents using immunoassay, 
polymerase chain reaction or a physical method such as mass spectrometry.  Immunological or nucleic acid assays are 
extremely sensitive and specific, but completely blind to unknown agents. 
101   J. R. Wilson, “Chem-Bio Detection:  A Race against Time,” Military Medical Technology Online,  September 
2001), 1-6.  Available at:  http://www.mmt-kmi.com/. 
102   The NBC Industry Group, The Health of Chemical-Biological Defense in the U.S. Military: A White Paper by the 
NBC Group,  (NBC Industry Group, November 1997). 
103   Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.:  
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), U.S. GPO, March 2000), 5.  Available at:  
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/chembio02012000.pdf.  
104  John G. Roos, “Grappling with Demons:  Deficiencies in Chem-Bio Protection Pose ‘Moderate to High Risk’ in the 
2MTW Plan,” in Armed Forces Journal International, (November 2000), 36-40. 
33 
The program conducts research, development, and procurement in three 
commodity areas of CB defense:  contamination avoidance, protection and identification, 
and decontamination.  CB defense programs are categorized broadly under five 
operational-oriented commodity areas (pillars of NBC Defense): contamination 
avoidance, protection (individual and collective), medical protection, decontamination, 
and modeling and simulation.105  Sound doctrine and realistic training remain 
fundamental to defending against WMD.  The result is a variety of new sensor systems, 
personal and collective protection systems, and decontamination systems.  But the 
training and doctrine to implement these programs, and the baseline competence for 
operating in a BW environment, is still far from becoming a reality.106  
Major systems that are currently being tested, or which are already in place, for 
detection, protection, decontamination and defense of maritime ports, ships and air 
facilities, include:   
a. Portal Shield 
The Portal Shield Advanced Concept Technology (ACTD) is designed as 
an interim capability to protect critical fixed sites such as airbases and ports.  It consists 
of an array of automated detectors networked into a central command post to provide 
rapid identification and warning of BW attacks while decreasing false alarms.  It is 
currently being used in several critical sites worldwide, and can potentially reduce 
casualties and maintain operational tempo at an air facility (See Figure 3.2). 
 
                                                 
105   Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Chemical and Biological Defense, FY-00-FY01 Overview, Joint Service 
Chemical and Biological Defense Program, (Washington, D.C., 2000).  The Navy invests heavily in products such as: sensor 
networks for detecting large area attacks, theater warning and reporting for multiple attacks, protective suits designed to 
enable continued operations, shipboard sensor systems and personal hand held biological agent detectors, to meet the 
objectives of NDAA.  
106   Christopher J. Vogt and Peter Novick, “Toward More Effective Technology Insertions for Chem/Bio Defense,” 
(paper presented at ASNE Day 2001 Proceedings, American Society of Naval Engineers, May 2001), 3-7.  CBDP invests 
heavily in technologies to provide improved capabilities to U.S. forces ensuring minimal adverse impact to operational tempo 
on the asymmetric battlefield.    
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Figure 3.2. Portal Shield Advanced Concept Technology (Portal Shield ACTD) and 
Joint Point Portal Shield (JPPS - XM-99).107 
 
b. The Interim Biological Agent Detector (IBAD)  
The Interim Biological Agent Detector (IBAD) provides the U.S. NSF 
with a near-term detection capability aboard combatant ships.  It is a Point Detector 
System that semi-automatically detects background change through air sample collection 
and alarms the crew of potential biological attacks.  It is composed of a particle 
sizer/counter, particle wet cyclone sampler and a manual Hand Held 
immunochromatographic Assay (HHA) identifier (see Figure 3.3).  HHAs are designed to 
identify one agent per assay and can identify eight different BW threat and four simulant 
agents.  HHAs can also be assigned to individual personnel.   
Within twenty minutes of activation, IBAD can detect, identify and 
produce a safely configured sample for laboratory analysis, and warn of the presence of 
biological agents.  One shortfall of the system is the decision framework about when to 
activate it and the time necessary to provide results.  Another is that the IBAD program 
currently provides only seventeen surface ships a contingency warning capability.108   
 
                                                 
107  DoD CBDP, Annual Report to Congress, (July 2001).   
108   IBAD system upgrades are part of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyer Flight IIA upgrades 
procured in FY 1999.  
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Figure 3.3. The Interim Biological Agent Detector (IBAD) System.109 
 
Because BW defense of NSF cannot exist on its own in LWZ or during 
inport operations in foreign ports, other service capabilities are critical in the overall 
defense initiative for providing security to ports and airfields.  To this end, the U.S. Army 
is the lead agent in the Joint spectrum.  Two critical systems for meeting collective 
protection goals for port and airfield security are the Army BIDS system and the Long 
Range Biological Standoff Detection System (LRBSDS).     
c. The Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS) 
The present system for aerosol detection on the battlefield is BIDS:  a 
mobile laboratory (including a suite of instruments and reagents, and technical personnel) 
in a truck (Humvee).  BIDS primarily protects the battle space against large area 
attacks.110   
d. The NDI-Long Range Biological Standoff Detection System 
(LRBSDS) 
The NDI-Long Range Biological Standoff Detection System (LRBSDS), 
(LRBSDS), mounted on UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, screens large areas of the 
battlespace.  With a thirty-kilometer range, it provides both an early warning and a 
                                                 
109   Ibid. 
110   BIDS also provides rapid detection identification of BW agents, a liquid sample for subsequent analysis, and 
communication of results over long distances.  It consists of a shelter mounted on a dedicated vehicle and is equipped with a 
biological detection suite employing complementary technologies.     
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mobile detection of manmade aerosols.  The “on-call” system mounts into a Blackhawk 
helicopter but does not require a dedicated aircraft (see Figure 3.4).111 
 
 
Figure 3.4. NDI – Long Range Biological Standoff Detection System (LRBSDS).112 
 
e. The Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS) 
The Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS) is in development 
to consolidate, coordinate, and integrate BW defense requirements of all services into a 
single defense program.  JBPDS will offer a detection system that will provide BW 
detection capabilities throughout the Services and throughout the battlespace.113  
JBPDS consists of a system-of-systems, including the Joint Point, Man 
Portable XM-96, the Joint Point, Shelter XM-97, and the Joint Point, Ship XM-98. Each 
serve four functions: (1) trigger, (2) collector, (3) detector, and (4) identification.  JBPDS 
will provide fully automated warning and detection, networked-based integration into 
regional theaters in concert with the Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) (as 
depicted in Figure 3.5) system.114 
 
                                                 
111   J. R. Wilson.  “Chem-Bio Detection:  A Race against Time,” Military Medical Technology Online, (2001), 1-6.  
Available at:  http://www.mmt-kmi.com/.  It takes about 30 minutes to load into the helicopter and plug into the aircraft’s 
power system.  The device can detect biological clouds out to 30 kilometers but is only capable of mapping it, not actually 
identifying the agent involved.  Identification requires a point detection device. 
112   DoD CBDP, Annual Report to Congress, (July 2001).   
113   Department of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.  Technical Manual, Operators Manual for 
Detection System, Biological Agent – Joint Point, Man Portable, Shelter, Ship and Auxiliary Equipment, (PCN 182-107470-
00),  (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Army, Navy, USAF, USMC, June 2001). 
114   Ibid.   
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Figure 3.5. The Battlefield Model under the Joint Warning and Reporting Network 
(JWARN).115 
 
f. The Joint Biological Point Detection System (“JBPDS-Ship XM-
98”) 
The Joint Biological Point Detection System (“JBPDS-Ship XM-98”) was 
first installed for operational testing onboard a DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer in 
August 2001.  It is touted as a possible means for providing the shipboard component of a 
common point detection network to be integrated with joint forces.  It detects BW agents 
in less than fifteen minutes, provides automated, knowledge-based, real time detection, 
and identification, and provides a point detection capability not yet realized in the U.S. 
Navy.  Once approved for use, it will replace the Navy IBAD system and Army BIDS, 
and provide detection capabilities for the Air Force and Marine Corps as well (see Figure 
3.6).   
                                                 
115   From Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chem/Bio Defense Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar, “The DoD 
Biological Detection Program NDIA Discussions,” discussion topics brief, (24 October 2000). 
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Figure 3.6. Joint Biological Point Detect System (JBPDS).116 
 
The JBPDS will not be placed on U.S. Navy platforms until 2003, at the 
earliest.  When fully installed it will provide coverage to only eighty-four surface vessels 
including DDG, LHD, LPD, and CVN classes.117   
In the event that early warning is not possible or units are forced to occupy 
or transit through contaminated environments, individual and collective protection 
systems provide the warfighter life-sustaining and continued operational capabilities.  
Personal protection systems include the Joint Service General Purpose Mask (JSGPM), 
which will provide protection against biological, chemical, and radiological agents (see 
Figure 3.7), the Advanced Chemical Protection Garment (ACPG), and the Joint Service 
Lightweight Integration Suit Technology (JSLIST) (see Figure 3.8) (once accepted for 
use) to provide protection from the effects of BW contaminants.118  Collective protection 
equipment includes two general categories:  stand-alone shelters and integrated systems 
that provide contamination-free, environmentally-controlled surroundings for personnel 
to perform their missions.  Collective protection, i.e., overpressure, can be applied to 
mobile and fixed sites, medical facilities, aircraft, vehicles, and ships.119  
                                                 
116   DoD CBDP, Annual Report to Congress, (July 2001).   
117   NSWC Crane Division, Code 805D, 6 September 2001.  Available at:  gates_bill@crane.navy.mil.   
118  CBDP, Annual Report to Congress, (July 2001), 10-11.  Available at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/chem_bio_def_program/2001_CBDP_Annual_Report.pdf.  JSLIST is lighter and less bulky, 
imposes less heat stress and reduces psychological physiological burdens.  It comes in three parts:  protective suit, protective 
boots and protective gloves. 
119   CBDP, Avoid, Protect, Recover - Joint Service Chemical and Biological Defense Program FY00-02 Overview, 
(undated), 6-7.   
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Figure 3.7. JSGPM. 
 
 
Figure 3.8. ACPG/JSLIST. 
 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Adversaries may strike using BW anywhere, with little or no warning.  The first 
indication of a BW attack may be a suspicious package or sick personnel, perhaps 
coupled by a claim of responsibility by a non-state actor, or it could be an overt attack 
with munitions from a state actor.  It will then be necessary to identify the cause, guide 
appropriate responses, and differentiate an actual attack from a false positive, which can 
itself cause serious disruption in U.S. NSF activities.   
In the next five-ten years, the BW proliferation threat will increase, resulting from 
development of BW agents that are far more difficult to detect and more capable delivery 
systems.120  DoD expects that more states with existing programs will master production 
                                                 
120   DoD CBDP, Annual Report to Congress, (July 2001), 10-11. 
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processes for complete weapons and will be less dependent on outside suppliers. States 
will be more proficient at incorporating BW agents into delivery systems and will focus 
on battlefield training, employment strategy and doctrine. Therefore, the threshold of 
some states to consider using these capabilities may be lowered.121 
Individual detectors may be the only initial source of information to predict and 
report downwind hazards. This information must be consolidated with tactical 
information (radar tracks, observed explosions, etc) to refine the information about an 
attack.  This concept requires “networking” ships sensors across the theater of operations 
and data integration and analysis at a higher level of command through information 
management system that considers detector inputs, intelligence reports, meteorological 
data, and other tactical information regarding own force and adversary’s capabilities.  
This data in conjunction with tactical systems should provide the capability to support 
command decision making and risk management, including personnel protection levels, 
ship maneuvering and decontamination, and CVBG movement.   
Many unfulfilled immediate needs have already been identified, for example, the 
need for rapid response and high sensitivity, the difficulty of integrating sampling and 
sample preparation into the system, the desirability of unattended operations, ruggedness 
for combat use, and so on.  In both the laboratory and in the combat environment, the 
U.S. Navy requires broader capabilities for diagnosing exposure and for identifying the 
unexpected than is currently possessed.  These shortcomings in detection and 
identification are widely recognized as a major limitation in BW defense capabilities.122 
The U.S. Navy is responsible for personnel and life cycle management, and for 
TTPs, training, exercises, and doctrinal assessments.123  Technology alone will not 
supply U.S. NSF military supremacy without TTPs and LPs consistent with doctrinal 
foundation and approved performance standards; the ability to organize and equip NSF, 
and to ensure personnel are appropriately trained through reinforcement by present 
technology is also critical to decreasing BW threats.                                                   
121   An assessment of potentially new biological agents that may challenge U.S. forces is in a DoD report to Congress 
entitled Advances in Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering: Implications for the Development of New Biological Warfare 
Agents, June 1996. 
122   Stephen S. Morse, 101. 
123   Kristin S. Kolet, “Asymmetric Threats to Threats to the United States,” National Institute for Public Policy, (Fall 
2001), 282-284.  For more discussion see Richard J. Harkness and the JCISS Study Group, “The Risks of a Networked 
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IV. SUSTAINING THE MISSION IN THE FACE OF BW ATTACKS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
What actions must the U.S. Navy take to ensure Naval Surface Forces (NSF) 
possess the required capabilities to fight through a BW attack?  The twenty-first century 
battlefield promises to be a novel and diverse environment that will distort the way U.S. 
NSF prepare to counter Biological Warfare (BW).  Mechanisms for change require broad 
and sustained efforts that cannot be restricted to specialized units or deferred to 
convenient times and future initiatives.  They must be instilled in daily actions, routine 
intentions and directives, and codified in NSF TTPs, training plans, and battle orders, and 
promulgated to warriors via General Operating Instructions and Tasking 
(OPGEN/OPTASKS); further, they must be "networked" and adapted to Joint Doctrine 
and JTTPs to allow U.S. NSF primacy in the joint arena. 
The United States continues to have global commitments and a continuing need 
for a forward-deployed naval presence as international response to a wide range of 
crises.124  The BW threat must be viewed as a possible condition of warfare, the backdrop 
against which American sailors and marines must be prepared to operate effectively. 
B. SUSTAINING THE MISSION 
1. Force Operations 
NSF must be capable of responding and deploying quickly to a variety of 
worldwide needs.  Counter-proliferation (CP) capabilities are required to meet those 
needs and BW defense is integral to CP.  The Commanders-in-Chief (CINC) Annual 
Assessment identified priorities that the CINCs themselves singled out as most crucial to 
achieving their peacetime and wartime missions (see Table 4.1) .125  Providing protection 
to U.S. and coalition forces must be effected by first ensuring that U.S. forces are 
prepared to sustain the BW mission.  
 
 
                                                 
124   Washington Times, “A Littoral Linchpin of Access,” (Washington, D.C.:  Washington Times, 12 August 2001). 
125   Department of Defense [DoD] Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Annual Report to Congress and 
Performance Plan, (Washington, D.C.:  Defense Technical Information Center [DTIC]:  U.S. Government Printing Office 
[U.S. GPO], March 2000), 3-5. Available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs. 
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1. Provide individual protection to forces and assist allies/coalition partners with relief from the 
effects of NBC 
2. Intercept conventional delivery of WMD and control collateral effects 
3. Provide collective protection to forces and assist allies/coalition partners with relief from the 
effects of NBC 
4. Mitigate the effects of WMD 
5. Detect and monitor development, production, deployment, employment of WMD 
6. Communicate the ability/will to employ interdiction/response capabilities 
7. Determine vulnerabilities in WMD development, production, transfer, deployment, and employment 
8. Conduct off-site attack to destroy, disable, and deny WMD targets 
9. Establish and maintain relations with allies, and potential adversaries to discourage development, 
production, and use of WMD 
10. Seize, destroy, disable, and deny transport of WMD 
11. Communicate the ability/will to employ defensive capabilities 
12. Determine vulnerabilities in decision making process related to WMD 
13. Conduct information warfare to destroy, disable, and deny WMD 
14. Support treaties, export controls, and political/diplomatic efforts 
15. Provide alternatives to the pursuit of WMD 
16. Provide intelligence collection capabilities in support of USG non-proliferation efforts 
17. Conduct on-site attack to seize, destroy, disable, and deny WMD targets 
18. Provide personnel, training, materiel, and equipment to support security assistance 
19. Destroy, disable, and deny actor's non-WMD resources and capabilities 
 
 
Table 4.1. Required CINC Counter-Proliferation Capabilities.126 
 
U.S. NSF must prepare for several possible scenarios, including NSF in port, 
within the Continental United States (CONUS) and in foreign theaters, and those 
operating in Littoral Warfare Zones (LWZs), or on the high seas.  NSF conducting In-
port operations must configure active and passive defenses support the local military 
command element as called for under Force Protection initiatives.127  
CP responsibility must reside at the Service level.  The CINC is required to 
provide CP capabilities but those means must be developed tactically at CO and OTC 
levels.  Both must be accountable for providing guidance and conducting operations 
associated with LPs designed to “fight the ship.”   
2. Working within the CBDP Management Structure 
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of Fiscal Year 1994 mandated 
a buildup of the Department of Defense (DoD) Chemical and Biological Defense 
                                                 
126   Ibid. 
127   Thomas W. Murrey, Jr., “Who’s Responsible:  Understanding Force Protection,” in Joint Force Quarterly:  A 
Professional Military Journal, No. 22 (Summer 1999), 105-108.  U.S. NSF should be prepared to pass BW defense 
information to the military authority for the local port, as well as through the chain of command.  BW defense requires actions 
be split between tactical management of responses and performance of BW defensive functions.  The operational 
commander/CINC then should be a position to provide subject matter experts with regard to agent behavior and effects, 
detection, individual and collective protection and decontamination.   
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Program (CBDP).  It requires that each service provide requirements and responsibility 
for the operation and maintenance of product delivery.  The CBDP management 
structure, seen in Figure 4.1 represents program coordination and integration for all 
Services. This structure was developed in 1996 to provide integration of medical and 
non-medical CB defense efforts at the Service level.   
The Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological 
Defense, DATSD(CBD), as deputy to the Director, Defense Research & Engineering 
(DDR&E), is responsible for overall coordination and integration of all defense research, 
development, and acquisition (RDA) efforts and provides overall guidance for planning, 
programming, budgeting, and program execution.  The program is divided into six 
commodity areas, each managed by one of the Services in accordance with the Joint 
Service Agreement, as follows:128  Contamination Avoidance; army, individual 
protection; marines corps, collective protection; navy, decontamination; air force, 
medical defense; army, modeling & simulation; navy.129 
                                                 
128   Department of Defense [DoD] Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Annual Report to Congress and 
Performance Plan, (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], July 2001), 13.  Available at:  
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/chem_bio_def_program/2001_CBDP_Annual_Report.pdf.  DATSD(CBD) remains the 
single office within OSD responsible for oversight of the DoD CBDP and retains approval authority for all planning, 
programming, and budgeting documents, responsibility for ensuring coordination between the medical programs and the non-
medical CB defense efforts, and management oversight of CBDP.  The Secretary of the Army is the Executive Agent (EA) for 
the CBDP and is responsible to coordinate, integrate, and review all Services’ CB defense requirements and programs.  The 
commodity areas correspond to the projects under the budget program elements.  There is also a program budget element to 
support program management and oversight, user testing, and doctrine development in accordance with the Joint Service 
Agreement.  The OSD NBC Defense Steering Committee provides direct oversight of the CBDP and is composed of the 
following members: (1) DDR&E, (2) Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), (3) Director, Chemical Biological 
Defense Directorate, DTRA, (DTRA(CB)), and (4) DATSD(CBD).  The Joint Service Integration Group (JSIG) is the 
principal steering group that oversees Service coordination and integration and CINC requirements and priorities for RDT&E 
and procurement.  The Joint Service Materiel Group (JSMG) is the principal steering group that manages execution of 
materiel development efforts to mitigate program risk across commodity areas, and to ensure ongoing efforts are not 
duplicative.  
129   Ibid., 11-21.  The military departments’ acquisition organizations execute the individual CB defense programs 
according to Service and DoD directives.  
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Figure 4.1. The CB Defense Program Management Structure.130 
 
3. In-Port/Theater Operations 
As provided in the CBDP, local forces from each service must be capable of 
assisting naval forces in warning, reporting and assessing BW threats and response 
measures.131 U.S. NSF organic BW management can help augment protection and 
decontamination measures for NSF and landing forces.  In areas where there is no local 
military NBC command, NSF would coordinate with U.S. Government (USG) agencies 
as well as the regional CINC for WMD issues.132   
                                                 
130   Ibid., 14-21. 
131   Ibid. 
132   Supporting capabilities must include intelligence alerts and warnings of BW threats when in port, and must provide 
for appropriate force capabilities to fight, survive and sustain the mission.  For landing forces, responses must begin at the 
lowest tactical level and proceed through the appropriate chain of command to the CINC.   
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The predominant function at the company, troop, or battery level is warning and 
reporting:  Sub-units and many ships have few BW defensive assets other than individual 
alarms and sensors.133  Higher commands must provide automated collection of detectors 
alarms and hazard warnings.   
Aircraft must collect results from passive detectors at airbases.  Air bases and port 
facilities should use automatic networked sensor configurations.  This concept can rely 
on commercial, non-propriety communications protocols and security, to prevent 
“spoofing” of the sensors.134   
If a BW attack has already occurred, or intelligence shows one as imminent, COs 
and OTCs must be prepared to respond.  Appropriate steps may include ordering a BW 
Decontaminated Zone (BWDZ) around port facilities, units, or airfields commensurate 
with intelligence reports, technical assessments, and doctrine, by issued OPTASKs that 
establish capabilities and limitations for access to these zones.135   
C. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 
Consequence Management (CM) counters effects of BW attack by preserving life, 
reducing suffering, and mitigating effects after an attack has occurred.136  Within DoD, 
the precise definition of CM is still an evolving concept.137  CJCSI 3214.01, Military 
Support to Foreign Consequence Management, defines CM as “Interagency assistance to 
mitigate damage resulting from the employment of NBC weapons by national, 
transnational, or sub-national actors.”138   
                                                 
133   Department of Defense [DoD] Joint Publication 3-11.  Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) 
Defense, 2000, III-5-19. Staff level personnel must bear the responsibility for conducting hazard prediction, capability to 
integrate reports from several units, and perform limited vulnerability analysis and attack area resolution between conflicting 
biological agent analysis, then have the ability to pass that information to the tactical level.    
134   Warning and reporting functions and BW information management and analysis, and basic meteorological data 
should be processed at this level to generate projections for CINC/CTF planning and execution of military responses.   
135   Forces can be marshaled away from contaminated environments unless extreme operational requirements dictate 
access to those zones.  If the location of the threat is identified and no attack has occurred, commanders should possess TTPs 
and LPs that establish minimum BWDZs for the threat, taking into consideration, actors, delivery means and meteorological 
situations.  Personal detection and protection equipment would then be capable of allowing forces to access the BWDZ if 
deemed necessary.   
136   Presidential Decision Directive 39.  “U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism”, (21 June 1995), 3.  Available at: 
http://www/fas/org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm.  For additional background on CM see Scott R. Taylor et, al. “Consequence 
Management:  In Need of a Timeout,” in Joint Force Quarterly:  A Professional Military Journal, No. 22 (Summer 1999), 78-
85. 
137   Lieutenant Colonel Kim Corcoran.  “Consequence Management:  An Increasing Need for Joint Doctrine”; in U.S. 
Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine Division’s Newsletter, Vol. 8, No. 1, (Suffolk:  U.S. Joint Forces 
Command, April 2000), 10. 
138   Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3214.01, “Military Support to Foreign Consequence 
Management Operations,” (30 June 1998), 3.  
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CM responses include efforts to reduce the harmful effects of successful attacks 
and integrates passive and active defenses, facility and personnel protection, and 
mitigation of effects through Health Services Support (HSS), and emergency response 
procedures.139  U.S. NSF often are the first to arrive on the scene during some crisis.140  
While the synergy produced by joint CM operations is important, naval doctrine and 
TTPs should allow NSF to conduct CM alone in an emergency.141 
The Chinese have an ancient saying, “kill one, frighten ten thousand.”  The world 
saw truth in that concept during the 1993 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in 
New York City, the Tokyo subway attack by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, the 1996 
Centennial Park bombing in Atlanta, the bombing of the USS COLE (DDG-67) in the 
port of Aden, Yeman in October 2000, and most recently the bombing of the World 
Trade Center Twin Towers and U.S. Pentagon on 11 September 2001.142  
BW provides state and non-state actors an inexpensive means to carry out 
asymmetric warfare on U.S. conventional strengths.  Since there is no proven long range 
detection capability in the U.S. Navy arsenal, what can be done subsequent to an attack to 
ensure U.S. NSF are capable of sustaining the mission?  Prevention and management of 
BW attacks or incidents is one of the most challenging priorities outside of detection and 
prevention.  Only the U.S. Army has a specialized Chemical Corps force structure that 
specializes in all aspects of NBC.143   
                                                 
139   Report of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of 
WMD.  Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. GPO, 14 July 1999), 156.  For 
example, strong efforts in detection capability at ports and airfields may act as a partial deterrent by forcing the aggressor to 
resort to other tactics or may reduce their willingness to use BW capabilities because of its presumed ineffectiveness. 
140   Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, Navy Strategic Planning Guidance:  With Long Range Planning 
Objectives, (Washington, D.C.:  DoD Printing Office, April 2000), 18. 
141   Corcoran.  “Consequence Management:  An Increasing Need for Joint Doctrine”, 6.  Currently, in the event of a 
BW attack, U.S. NSF do not possess the full array of response assets and expertise required to adequately deal with the effects 
of BW or the necessary depth to sustain CM operations.  In the case of an actual attack or incident, Commanding Officers and 
Operational Commanders would require immediate assistance from the CJTF/CINC that would not in “total” be forth coming 
due to lack of “full-up-round” doctrine, TTP, what has been described here as LP, as well as institutionalized CM leadership 
measures.     
142   William Rosenau, “Aum Shinrikyo’s Biological Weapons Program:  Why did it Fail?” (Washington, D.C.:  Rand 
Corporation, 2001), 289. 
143   The Army Chemical School is the training facility for all the services in both chemical and biological detection, and 
while the Navy has its own NBC instructors where training covers BW (and CW) detection, there are significant differences in 
both the detection of and response to biological agents and the manner in which CM might be carried out in the event of an 
attack.   
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Joint Publication 3-11, outlines doctrine for NBC Defense.  It stresses the need to 
counter NBC operations with defense and deterrence.144  To defend against this threat 
requires command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I), logistical 
support, medical support, and education and training.  Although not directly addressing 
WMD use by terrorists, it also points out “the potential for their use can range from 
blackmail or acts of terrorism during peace to escalation during conflict or war.”145  The 
strategy of defense and deterrence is based on, “providing direction, intelligence, and 
employment of U.S. forces in countering enemy NBC war making capabilities.”146  
Presently, a BW attack would have catastrophic effects causing both military and 
psychological impact on NSF that could affect their ability to succeed in a contaminated 
environment.  The lack of unified doctrine for Naval and Joint forces in the critical arena 
of CM deserves immediate notice. The inability of NSF to sustain the CM mission, 
without reliance on CM partnerships for BW DP of port embarkation areas and airfields 
could entail the difference in achieving National Strategic Objectives.   
D. HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT (HSS) 
Force protection includes individual, collective, and casualty protective measures, 
as well as medical countermeasures, resulting from the implementation of policies, 
doctrines, procedures and equipment to enable personnel to survive and operate in a 
biological environment.147  It considers DP aspects of BW integrated defense, including 
medical countermeasures, and requires doctrine, TTPs, and LPs for combating BW.   
Immediate medical diagnostics are required to evaluate exposure, to identify 
individuals who have been exposed, and to guide appropriate treatment, control, and 
response.  These instruments are not currently available.148  Because a BW attack may 
occur where no detectors are present, there is an essential need for rapid and sensitive 
medical diagnostic capabilities to determine the cause and to differentiate possible attack 
from a myriad of other infections that may begin with similar signs and symptoms.   
                                                 
144   Joint Publication 3-11.  Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense, 2000, I-1. 
145   Ibid.  
146   Ibid., I-3. 
147   Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3214.01, (Washington, D.C.). 
148  Stephen S. Morse, “Detecting Biological Warfare Agents”, in Raymond A. Zilinskas.  Biological Warfare:  Modern 
Offense and Defense, (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 96. 
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The objective of HSS in BW contaminated areas must be to:  (a) return to duty the 
maximum number of personnel as soon as possible, (b) manage casualties so that BW 
agent injuries are minimized and any other injuries or illnesses are not aggravated, (c) 
protect persons handling contaminated casualties or working in contaminated areas, (d) 
avoid spreading contamination into other areas, and (e) continue Medical Treatment 
Facilities (MTF) operations to maintain services unrelated to the BW illnesses and 
injuries.  
All U.S. NSF must be prepared to operate in contaminated environments; HSS 
personnel also must be prepared to provide patient care.149  Staffing HSS units is based 
on conventional warfare requirements; these units will likely be taxed in their ability to 
provide effective response.  Depending on pre-treatment or vaccination, a relatively 
significant “ramp up” period may be required.  Future research and development work 
must focus on combining as many of these individual countermeasures as possible, while 
at the same time finding other means of increasing efficacy of their use.  
On a contaminated battlefield Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) levels 
III and IV result in body heat buildup, reduced mobility, and degraded senses and may 
ultimately reduce unit effectiveness.150  The focus of HSS should be on keeping forces in 
the battle through effective and efficient triage, emergency treatment, decontamination 
and control, and prompt evacuation to save lives and maximize the return-to-duty rate.151   
BW attacks are difficult to recognize because they may not have an immediate 
affect.  HSS personnel must monitor for BW indicators such as: an increase in disease 
incidences or fatality rates, sudden presentation of an exotic disease, and other sequential 
epidemiological events, especially when presented in lines of communications.152  
Navy doctrine, TTPs, and LPs must deal directly with HSS operations to limit the 
spread of disease and minimize casualties and must include HSS and first responders’ 
                                                 
149  Decontamination of patients and transportation assets causes evacuation delays, making first aid and patient care 
even more critical.  Current use of medical countermeasures demonstrates a plethora of medications whose use is either 
specific to a small family of threat agents, or requires multiple vaccinations.  
150   United States Marine Corps (USMC).  Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 4-11.1:  Health Services 
Support Operations, (Washington, D.C.:  USMC Headquarters [HQ], 10 March 1998). 
151  Ibid.  To maximize the unit’s survival and effectiveness, commanders must take action to avoid BW contamination 
by making maximum use of alarm and detection equipment and unit dispersion; overhead shelters, shielding materials, and 
protective covers; and collective protection shelters.    
152   Passive defensive measures (such as immunizations, physical conditioning, use of arthropod repellents, use of 
protective masks, and practice of good sanitation) lessen the effects of most biological intrusions.   
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capabilities into the calculus of requirements.153  Information on enemy BW use is 
important for planning and executing HSS operations.154  HSS operations must be 
integrated into all levels of BW responses.  For example, Phasing Support Ashore during 
movement of amphibious operations is essential.155   
Preventive medicine efforts can dramatically reduce the incidence of disease.156  
Proactive preventive medicine measures should be included into all levels of TTPs, 
incorporating phased coordination of casualty movement and medical regulating 
processes.157   
Once BW agents have been used, agent identification is important to medical 
intelligence channels for operational purposes.  HSS personnel must be familiar with 
symptoms of BW casualties.  Operational forces must attempt to distinguish between 
epidemics of natural origin and BW attacks and ensure that medical and tactical 
intelligence channels communicate.158   
Basic protection consists of denying agent access to the respiratory and digestive 
systems and immunization of individuals. If a field detection and identification capability 
is not available, recognition of BW agents must be based on epidemiology and 
symptoms. Table 4.2 provides Indicators of a BW attack. 
                                                 
153   Ronald M. Atlas, “Biological Weapons Pose Challenge for Microbiology Community:  Microbiologists Should 
Help Shape Policies Protecting Against BW but Safeguarding Legitimate Research,” ASM News 64 (1998), 383-389 in R. M. 
Atlas, “Combating the Threat of Bio-Warfare and Bio-Terrorism:  Defending Against BW is Critical to Global Security,” 
BioScience 49, (June 1998), 18.  To increase chances for success, personnel must keep immunizations current, use available 
preventive treatment against suspected agents, pre-treat for suspected agents, and have antidotes and essential supplies readily 
available for known or suspected biological agents.   
154   The Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) has overall responsibility for HSS services to embarked 
personnel and can benefit from information such as the current threat level, mission, terrain, geography, weather, forces at 
risk, opposing forces, etc.   
155   Prevention of disease and non-battle injuries is a critical function.  Naval Medical (NAVMED) P-5010 BUMED 
Manual of Naval Preventive Medicine, prescribes specific preventive medicine measures available to NSF. The concept of 
operation/scheme of maneuver during BW defenses scenarios, combat intensity, predicted size and duration of the 
contaminated environment, and casualty estimates is crucial to ensuring the entire HSS system is responsive and can only be 
obtained through institutionalized principles:  
156   United States Marine Corps (USMC), Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 4-11.1:  Health Services 
Support Operations (Washington, D.C.:  USMC HQ). 
157  Ibid.  Patient movement may occur in two phases: (1) evacuation—the movement of patients between point of 
injury or onset of disease to a facility that can provide the necessary treatment capability, and (2) medical regulating—the 
process of selecting destination medical facilities with necessary biological defense capabilities for patients being medically 
evacuated, between, into, and out of different theaters of geographic combatant commands and CONUS. 
158   United States Marine Corps (USMC), Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 4-11.1C:  Treatment of 
Biological Warfare Agent Casualties; U.S. Army.  Army FM 8-284; U.S. Navy.  NAVMED P-5042; U.S. Air Force.   AIR 
FORCE AFMAN (I) 44-156, (Washington, D.C.:  Headquarters, Departments of the Army, The Navy, and the Air Force, and 
Commandant, USMC, 17 July 2000).  It is likely that a BW attack will be completed before the local commander, or the 
medical advisor, is aware that it has taken place.  HSS units should rely on information not only from detectors and 
intelligence sources, but also from the casualties themselves  
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• Point-source epidemiology with a record number of sick and dying patients presenting 
within a short period of time (within 12 to 48 hours). 
• Very high attack rates (60 to 90 percent of personnel are affected/symptomatic). 
• A high incidence of pulmonary involvement signaling an aerosol route of infection.  This 
would apply to such agents as plague, tularemia, anthrax, and Q fever where the usual 
form of infection is not pulmonary.  
• “Impossible epidemiology.” i.e. if CCVHF occurred in Alaska or New York, or VEE in 
England, a man-made epidemic would be extremely likely.  
• Record fatality rates would be expected for many agents, since a large number of victims 
would receive doses of organisms far beyond what could possibly occur in nature.  This 
is especially true of an aerosol attack. 
• Localized areas of disease epidemics might occur in an area or sector downwind from the 
point of attack.  
• Multiple infections at a single site with unusual pathogens.  
• Increased numbers of dead animals of all species, such as rats for plague, or horses with 
equine encephalitis viruses.  
• Protection of those working within in-door environments or environments with filtered 
air at the time of the attack.  
• The near simultaneous outbreak of similar or different epidemics at the same site or at 
different sites or at military installations around the world.  
• Direct evidence of an attack, such as finding an unexploded munitions or a contaminated 
exploded munitions; admission by hostile forces or terrorists that BW are being used; 
witnessing an attack; or intelligence information reporting use of BW agents by hostile 
forces from covert agents working within those hostile forces. 
Table 4.2. Medial “Indicators” that a BW Attack has Taken Place.159 
 
Although most BW agents require days to manifest, some agents produce their 
effects in minutes to hours.  Problems with recognition and diagnosis of BW casualties 
include:  (1) signs and symptoms of most BW agents are similar or identical to those of 
endemic and epidemic diseases, and (2) the nature and timing of symptoms will vary with 
the route of exposure.  This information is used to facilitate the diagnosis of individual 
cases, to initiate immediate treatment, and to permit the arrangement for the reception of 
casualties (see Table 4.3).   
                                                 
159   United States Marine Corps (USMC), Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 4-11.1C:  Treatment of 
Biological Warfare Agent Casualties (Washington, D.C.:  USMC HQ), Series.  Once illness begins to appear, the presence of 
an airborne BW agent should be relatively obvious because of the large numbers of casualties and the absence of a common 
exposure source such as food or water.  However, food and/or water may also serve as a vehicle of transmission.  If the 





(1) Conventional casualties with no BW injury and with no contamination of their 
clothing and equipment. 
 
(2) Conventional casualties with no BW injury but with contamination of their clothing 
and equipment.  




(1) BW agent casualties with no other injury. 
 
(2) Mixed casualties with conventional and BW injuries.  Since BW munitions often 
include burst charges, such injuries may occur as part of a BW agent attack.  They may 
also be present when the injury and conventional injury occur at different times.  Also, 
mixed casualties may result when biological injuries are combined with natural 
illnesses (infectious disease still accounts for the majority of casualties in conventional 
warfare).  
c. Indirect BW 
Casualties (IBC) 
 
(1) Casualties suffering combat stress reaction occur often in warfare, but may be more 
frequent where BW threats exist.  The service member will have the additional stress of 
isolation from wearing the protective ensemble; additional fatigue when wearing the 
protective garments; and fear of BW agents.160 
 
(2) Some BW agent treatments can have undesirable side effects when taken 
inappropriately, or in large enough quantities.  Antibiotics kill desirable bacteria in the 
digestive tract, causing abdominal pain and frequent bowel movements.  Medical 
personnel must be alert for their appearance. 
 
(3) Wearing the protective ensemble makes dissipation of excess body heat more 
difficult. Wearing the mask also makes water intake difficult.  Both will increase the 
probability of heat injury (heat exhaustion or heat stroke). 
 
(4) Indirect BW casualties will most likely be the largest group requiring treatment. 
 
Table 4.3. Types of Casualties that May be Seen in BW Environments.161 
 
Initial casualty management and treatment of those contaminated with BW will 
vary with the situation and the nature of contaminant.162  HSS must be prepared to treat 
any range of the following:   
• BW agent casualties generated within the geographical area   
• Patients received from a forward and, in some cases, a lateral MTF  
                                                 
160   For additional information regarding Combat Stress Control, see FM 8-51, FM 22-51, and MCRP 6-11c.  Available 
at:  http://www.usmc.mil/. 
161   USMC, Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 4-11.1C:  Treatment of Biological Warfare Agent Casualties, 
(Washington, D.C.:  USMC HQ),  Series. 
162   Specifics on BW contaminated patients at MTFs can be found in USMC FM 8-10-7.  BW attacks should be 
suspected with any sudden increase in unexplained numbers casualties presenting with the same signs and symptoms.  
Consideration should be given to:  (1) groups of patients from a specific unit/area presenting with the same illness signs and 
symptoms in a short period of time (hours to days), and (2) signs and symptoms not associated with any known endemic 
diseases in the area of operations. 
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• Patients suffering from a combination of injuries/illnesses (BW and 
conventional, BW and CW, and BW and endemic disease)  
• Patient suffering from battle injuries and that have not been exposed to 
any BW agents, and 
• Enemy prisoners of war, detained persons, and noncombatants, when 
directed.163 
U.S. Navy Level I MTFs include battle dressing stations (BDS), NSF medical 
departments, and BDSs in support of the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF).  Casualties must be 
considered contaminated until proven otherwise, and all levels should prepare to receive 
casualties.  After initial receipt, five levels of care can be demonstrated (see Table 4.4). 
 
Level I 
     Level I includes self-aid and buddy care, examination and 
emergency lifesaving measures such as maintenance of airway, 
control of bleeding, prevention and control of shock, and 
prevention of further injury.  
Level II 
     Level II care could be carried out onboard U.S. Navy ships by 
Independent Duty Corpsman (IDC) personnel.  There are limited 
outpatient clinical services, initial trauma response, and no 
patient holding capability. 
Level III 
     Level III care can be accomplished on larger amphibious force 
ships that possess large medical facilities or on one of the two 
Medical Ships if positioned in the region.   
Level IV 
     Level IV care provides definitive therapy for patients in the 
recovery phase.  If rehabilitation cannot be accomplished within 
a pre-determined holding period, patients are sent to Level V. 
Level V 
     Level V care is convalescent, restorative, and rehabilitative.  
Level V care is normally provided by military, Department of 
Veterans Affairs, or civilian hospitals in CONUS.  
 
Table 4.4. Five Levels of Care Post BW Attack (or Incident).164 
 
E. CONCLUSION  
The events of 11 September 2001 dictate that a new approach to force deployment 
and doctrine is needed.  U.S. NSF can no longer assume that their entrance into LWZs, 
foreign harbors, or access to air bases will go unopposed by unconventional weapons.   
NSF requirements for BW defense should be addressed individually and jointly 
along with research, development and acquisition programs, both overseen by 
ATSD(CBD).  Under the direction of Navy Counter-Proliferation (OPNAV N70CP), 
                                                 
163   USMC, Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 4-11.1C:  Treatment of Biological Warfare Agent Casualties, 
(Washington, D.C.:  USMC HQ).   
164  Ibid. Under operational conditions, psychological effects may complicate the medical situation. Upon recognition of 
BW attacks, the agent identity must be determined.  It is unlikely that BW agents will produce single casualties under field 
conditions.  
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NSF are facing a pinnacle point where new doctrine, TTPs, and LPs must be “singled up” 
towards satisfying necessary threats from BW aggressors.   
Integration between Naval forces and Joint resources under CBDP management 
structures is necessary to develop capabilities that will sustain U.S. NSF in the near future 
by providing necessary support in LWZ, and in foreign ports and airbases.  Creation of 
these vital directives will allow Surface Warriors to work within the Joint Spectrum 
where capabilities exceed the U.S. Navy’s without risk of facing a BW catastrophe 
analogous to the attacks on USS COLE (DDG-67), the World Trade Centers, and the 
Pentagon.165       
COs and OTCs face new problems when considering the BW threat. The 
emergence of a new “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) with the attacks on 
American soil, further highlight the steps that actors are willing to take to compliment 
their asymmetric strategies against the United States.166  Doctrine must be envisioned that 
enables NSF to detect, protect, project, coordinate and counter BW threats and attacks. 
Substantial gains can be recognized by diligent efforts in transitioning from the 
passive to active stage of BW preparation.  This requires transformation and positioning 
personnel from collateral BW functions to sound manning positions suitable for 
countering the threat.  At a minimum, personnel possessing expertise should be 
positioned in billets ranging from CVBG Staffs, amphibious squadrons, and destroyer 
squadrons, to USMC battalion, regiment and wing staffs to ensure expertise is available 
to direct BW efforts when needed.  
Until each and every platform is self-capable, collective protection must harness 
the capabilities of each of the Services.167  While addressing BW defense and CF, the 
United States cannot afford to “stovepipe” capabilities between services.  Emphasis must 
be placed on how to achieve DP for all forces using means from the most capable in 
                                                 
165   Editor in Chief Dick Cole, “USS COLE:  Where Do We Go from Here?” in Surface Warfare, Vol. 26, No. 1, 
(January/February 2001), 6-12.  Available at:  http://surfacewarfare.nswc.navy.mil/. 
166   The author’s use of the term “Revolution in Military Affairs,” (RMA) here refers to a fundamental change in the 
means of warfare.  Doctrine, TTPs, and LPs along with present technology to combat adversaries’ asymmetric means of 
warfare equates to a “new set of rules” and organizational relationships versus simply technological enhancements.   
167   The author’s use of the term Collective Protection should not be confused with its usage in formal models already 
presented in DoD, instead it is meant to imply a “collection” of all of the most effective offensive and defensive technologies, 
capabilities, doctrine and TTPs that either currently exist or are emerging, but with an increased emphasis on engaging 
operators in cognitive approaches for employment through use of LPs. 
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specific areas, such as BW, to work together to provide vital defenses (i.e. CM, HSS, and 
Training).   
In June of 1942, Admiral E. J. King stated to the graduating class of the U.S. 
Naval Academy, “[D]ifficulties is the name given to things it is our business to 
overcome.”168 Though BW defense is difficult, preventing and countering BW 
proliferation will prove impossible if we do not address the cause as well as the 
symptoms, the demand as well as the sources.  
Moreover, horrific consequences of BW from state and non-state actors place a 
premium on deterrence, and if that fails, actions taken in response to BW.169  The U.S. 
Navy can close the gap in this area with emphasis on doctrine, TTPs, and LPs that 
harness detection and protection technologies, and that make critically important CM and 
HSS actions to combat this threat.   
                                                 
168   E.J. King, address to the graduating class of the U.S. Naval Academy (19 June 1942) in Commander Douglas G. 
Hancher, ed., Executive Decision Making (Newport:  National Security Decision Making Department, U.S. Naval War 
College, 2000), 2-1. 
169   Ronald F. Lehman, “Reassurance and Dissuation:  Countering the Motivation to Acquire WMD,” in Peter L. Hays, 
Vincent J. Jodoin, and Alan R. Van Tassel, eds., Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (New 
York:  McGraw-Hill, 1998), 116-117.  Adapted from Lehman’s conclusions of the central message of Proliferation:  Threat 
and Response. 
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V. THE WAY AHEAD -- PROPOSALS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
The U.S. Navy prepares to counter biological warfare (BW) largely through 
advances in technology; however, materiel superiority alone is not sufficient.  Of greater 
importance is institutionalization of training and education, doctrine, leadership 
organizations, and warrior-centric humans that effectively take advantage of technology. 
U.S. NSF will remain inadequately prepared and vulnerable to BW attack until a 
full spectrum of defenses is implemented.  Further, doctrine must capture key tenants of 
joint concept developments to ensure integration into Joint Doctrine and JTTPs where 
necessary.170   
Executive and legislative branches of government have voiced concern about BW 
which could be used by state actors, or by terrorist groups, in the combat theater against 
NSF.  In contrast to nuclear weapons, BW are relatively easy to produce but their 
production is exceptionally hard to detect.  Realizing this, the U.S. Government is trying 
to reduce the BW threat through a variety of means.171  
Means range from the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), to requirements 
under the CBDP.  Behind these efforts is the knowledge that as long as the use of 
biological agents provides an advantage to a military or terrorist force, some national or 
non-national entity might be willing to develop and use them.  In the 1996 Proliferation: 
Threat and Response, former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry stated: 
Hostile groups and nations have tried - or have been able – to obtain these 
weapons, the technology, and homegrown ability to make them or ballistic 
missiles that can deliver the massive annihilation, poison, and death of 
these weapons hundreds of miles away...Terrorists operate in a shadowy 
world in which they can detonate a device and disappear…regimes may 
try to use these devastating weapons as blackmail, or as an inexpensive 
way to sidestep the U.S. military’s overwhelming conventional military 
superiority...The bottom line is, unlike during  the Cold War, those who 
possess…NBC weapons may actually use them. 
                                                 
170   Commander Joint Warfighting Center [CJWC], Concept for Future Joint Operations:  Expanding Joint Vision 2020, 
(Fort Monroe:  JWC Printing Office, 1997), 76-79. 
171   Ibid. 
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Because the BW threat is prominent, it is not surprising that American leaders are 
concerned about the ability of the military to meet that threat.  Investigations into this 
area provided information that was not reassuring.172  BW defense readiness, however, 
has always been an elusive target. There has existed a gap between high level political 
actions aimed at improving readiness and actual accomplishments at the operations level.  
Although increased funding is important to BW readiness, the problem is more difficult 
and complex than can be solved by dollars alone.173  
A. PROPOSALS – FUTURE THOUGHTS 
As a result of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, CB defense funding was 
enhanced by $1 billion.  Emphasis on detection and protection technologies, however, 
with minimal regard for means of employment, organization and training, doctrine, and 
TTPs required to implement them, present a cost to NSF collective protection; NSF have 
little capability to protect facilities or supplies from contamination if they suffer a BW 
attack.  The worse case scenario could have terrorist BW attacks in the United States 
timed to coincide with the deployment of U.S. NSF to an overseas theater to face a BW 
capable enemy.   
On February 13, 2001, at Norfolk Naval Air Station President George W. Bush 
stated, “[W]e must prepare our nation against the dangers of a new era.  The grave threat 
from…BW…has not gone away with the cold war.  It has evolved into many separate 
threats…adversaries seeking tools of terror are less predictable and more diverse.”174   
Point detector systems currently available provide a measure of defense against 
smaller scale attacks, but cannot in themselves provide the necessary warning to prevent 
exposure to landing forces and associated personnel.  Detectors must be deployed to 
ensure both detection of source attacks at a considerable distance upwind of the forces, 
and rapid response to point attack.  Consequently, detection, identification and 
confirmation should be multi-layered and in sufficient depth.   
                                                 
172   When the Senate ratified the CWC, important issues were raised about the need for improvements in the BW 
defense readiness (the ability to survive and operate in a BW environment) of the U.S. Armed Forces. 
173   Wiener.  “Biological Warfare Defense,” in Raymond A. Zilinskas.  Biological Warfare:  Modern Offense and 
Defense, 119-120. 
174   President George W. Bush, remarks at Norfolk Naval Air Station (13 February 2001) in Department of Defense 
[DoD] Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Annual Report to Congress and Performance Plan, (Washington, D.C.:  
U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], July 2001).  Available at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/chem_bio_def_program/2001_CBDP_Annual_Report.pdf. 
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Detector systems should be augmented with standoff or remote point systems to 
provide early warning capability beyond current capabilities. Means of agent detection 
and identification include: 
• Non-specific. A system that can discriminate an unusual or man-made 
cloud from naturally occurring background aerosols, such as mist or fog; 
• Generic. Capable of analyzing aerosol or particle content to determine if 
they are a hazard (chemical or biological);  
• Specific.  The ability to identify specific BW agents at the highest level of 
field agent detection, prior to laboratory confirmation; and 
• Deployment of Detectors. Detector placement requires the detection 
requirement become part of doctrinal understandings, TTPs, and LPs, 
which must account for assessments of the detector capabilities, 
intelligence and environmental factors related to the risk of an attack 
utilizing BW.   
Could the lack of qualified, trained, and prepared U.S. NSF cost success in a 
combat environment?  The U.S. Navy has a valued stake in sustaining professional forces 
with means, expertise, and responsibility for BW readiness for its forces.175  The lack of 
NSF trained in BW defensive tactics generates concern about future conflicts should 
ports and airfields be attacked with BW.  The U.S. Army Chemical Corps could be used 
as a model for the best example of a significant military entity dedicated to BW 
readiness.176  
If the U.S. Navy desires to ensure that BW expertise and organizational support is 
available for future threats it should create and maintain organizations with personnel and 
expertise in this critical area.  The only place the U.S. Navy can realistically get that 
expertise currently is from the Army’s Chemical Corps.177  
An NBC Industry Group report reflects that GAO investigations have repeatedly 
stated that commanders have not adequately prioritized BW defense, despite the lessons 
                                                 
175   The U.S. Marine Corps possesses a small number of dedicated BW defense experts but a large percentage are in the 
CB Incident Response Force (CBIRF) whose mission includes force protection and support to homeland defense of CB attacks 
by terrorists.The CBIRF also supports the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU), however it relies on personnel who perform 
BW readiness functions as a collateral, rather than primary, duty. 
176   The U.S. Army has the most prominent role in the Joint Services Integration Group (JSIG) which addresses national 
defense requirements and priorities.   
177   The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), is responsible for the medical 
management of infectious diseases and BW agents and the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense 
(USAMRICD) is responsible for medical chemical warfare defense. These organizations handle very unique aspects of CB 
defense which are not duplicated by any other element of the Services, DoD or the private sector. 
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learned from the 1990-91 Gulf War.178  It proposes a reporting system through higher 
echelons to target attention to this critical area through reporting measures incorporated 
into current Status of Readiness and Training reporting System (SORTS).  As it would be 
a visible and documented measure of effectiveness (MOE), fostering command attention, 
it would send an unmistakable message that BW is a priority.179  
Two types of information on such a report could be: (1) a comparison of 
serviceable BW defense equipment on hand versus requirements and (2) training 
conducted by the unit.  No longer would BW defense readiness be in the category of "out 
of sight - out of mind."180 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As directed by the CBDP, the U.S. Navy is responsible for personnel and life 
cycle management, and has primary responsibility for TTPs, training, exercises, and 
doctrinal assessments.  While current systems are presumably the building blocks of an 
equitable defense network against BW, they will not provide U.S. NSF with supremacy 
without the benefits of doctrine, TTPs, LPs, appropriately trained personnel, and actions 
that support Consequence Management (CM) and Health Services Support (HSS).   
To enable the U.S. Navy to take advantage of investments in biological defense, 
and to ensure they result in improved capabilities against current threats, the following 
recommendations are offered.  The U.S. Navy should:  
• Develop a dedicated BW CP Warfare Community for full-time biological 
(chemical and radiological) defense with adequate manning, training, 
expertise, and career incentive to attract professionals matching the BW 
threat.  Instituting this major force multiplier should be approached to 
focus talents of those few for the benefit of the entire fleet. 
                                                 
178   The NBC Industry Group.  The Health of Chemical-Biological Defense in the U.S. Military, (Washington, D.C.:  
The NBC Industry Group White Paper, November 1997).  Available at:  http://www.nbcindustrygroup.com/.  It suggests that 
an important, low cost action to improve BW defense readiness would be to require that each unit document its state of CB 
defense readiness on its unit readiness reports.  When an area is reportable, the commander has to pay particular attention to it 
since he approves the report.   
179   The Joint Program Office for Biological Defense (JPO-BD) is focused on the mission of BW defense, an important 
function in light of Iraqi disclosures in this area.  The work being done in the CB defense area within the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is important in that it promotes research in very advanced technological applications. 
The successful technologies can then be passed to the Services to exploit.   
180   The NBC Industry Group. Available at:  http://www.nbcindustrygroup.com/.  Once the information is available, 
focused actions can be taken to bring units with lower levels of equipment or training to a suitable standard. Also, contingency 
planners can consider the level of readiness of different elements of the force and the actions needed to prepare units for 
deployment to a theater where a BW threat exists.   
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• Provide cognitive definition of the threat to the fleet -- and then focus on 
planning, training, funding, equipping, and exercising vital resources that 
will ensure NSF sustain supremacy in the face of asymmetric attacks. 
• As an important step towards minimizing the asymmetric effect of BW on 
conventional capabilities, provide support to commands and agencies that 
directly contribute to BW defense readiness and train NSF to the effects of 
BW.  
• Establish explicit and out-come oriented goals linked to Warfighters’ 
ability to survive, fight, and prevail in BW environments 
• Identify quantitative and qualitative MOEs for use in assessing progress 
towards toward achieving BW defense 
• Maintain a source of BW experts who can support U.S. NSF needs in the 
defense against BW in operational staffs.  A tremendous example of this 
effort is illustrated by the U.S. Army's Chemical Corps. 
• Improve BW knowledge and training through the use of improved Navy 
Operational Requirements relating to biological defense defined in BW 
General Operating Instructions and Tasking (OPGEN/OPTASKs) 
• Reevaluate the manner in which Consequence Management (CM) and 
Health Services Support (HSS) are conducted ─ CM and HSS must be 
integrated with DP in doctrine and TTPs, and must position NSF to defend 
organically without other Services support where necessary 
• Reassess doctrinal perceptions of operationally employing assets during 
BW warfare and provide visibility to the specific level of BW readiness 
throughout the Navy. Unit readiness reporting via SORTS might be an 
important element in accomplishing this. 
• Increase Navy and Joint exercises to include BW defense training 
requirements and incorporate them into Individual Deployment Training 
requirements, and Fleet Battle Experiments (FBE) 
• Establish In-port and At-Sea BW performance and readiness standards for 
NSF Commanding Officers and OTC’s use in promulgating Local Unit 
Practices (LPs) 
• Hasten the Doctrine Review and Development process to ensure that 
Naval doctrine and TTPs feed directly into Joint doctrine and JTTP 
• Pursue Navy doctrine and TTPs necessary for BW readiness in the Navy-
after-Next.  It is paramount that resources be directed towards these efforts 
sooner than later. 
• Adequately compensate Fleet staffs, Battle Group staffs, Tactical staffs 
and Amphibious Ready Groups through “Manning” procedures meant to 
realize appropriate levels of knowledge and capability 
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• Invest significantly in appropriations designed to ensure that NSF are 
capable of defeating any adversary that chooses to adopt BW as a means 
to counter U.S. Navy capabilities 
Many of the recommendations suggested above, while conceptually simple, 
present challenges in the Navy organization.  If the recommendation to develop a BW CP 
warfare community was adopted, the U.S. Navy would need to identify specific 
deliverables with implications for each element of the Navy’s responsibilities of 
Organizing, Training, and Equipping its new forces to sustain the mission in the face of 
contaminated environments.   
C. THE WAY AHEAD 
Against the backdrop of the BW threat, the U.S. Navy must consider its position, 
it has funded and built systems, added new technologies, and created a BW management 
source through the establishment of CNO Executive Agent for CB Defense, Deputy 
Secretary of the Navy for Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments (OPNAV 
N70) and the Office of Counter Proliferation (N70CP).  What is now needed is the next 
“progression of criticality,” that is development of new doctrine, and a better doctrine 
review process.  These developments will enable creation of adequate TTPs at Numbered 
Fleet and Operational levels, and clear the way for precise direction via Operational 
Orders and Tasking that benefit COs and OTCs in the establishment of Local Unit 
Practices (LP).   
The U.S. Navy should add experts in the field of CP and BW defense.  The 
experts can create a decision making process that can evaluate and assess potential 
threats, identify and counter BW aggressors, provide for emerging technologies and new 
processes against viable threats, streamline the doctrinal process to allow for the 
establishment of comprehensive TTPs and LPs fleet-wide, and take a “long view” at 
training strengths and weaknesses.181  Through sound doctrine, LP training and 
requirements, and TTPs the U.S. Navy is capable of emerging victorious against both 
state and non-state actors using BW.  
The terror associated with BW can be overcome by looking now to emerging 
threats and quickly overcoming the strategic advantage that can be put forth by state and 
                                                 
181   Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View, (Washington, D.C.:  Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 1991), 3-
10, 105-123.   
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non-state actors.  Technologies research and development at the DoD level shouldered 
upon strict doctrine and Navy TTPs can achieve goals established by the CBDP.  
Enhanced training programs sanctioned by the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and 
Fleet changes to operational practices of CP can become the catalyst that institutionalizes 
U.S. NSF capabilities to survive, fight and prevail in contaminated environments. 
Without this revolutionary understanding of the BW threat and early action on the 
part of the U.S. Navy, NSF could face barbaric actors who may attempt to deter or deny 
U.S. forces from the sea and thereby denying United States national interests.   
The success of today’s Navy, and Navy-after-Next demands that the BW threat 
will flourish until resolve is established to diminish fear from BW through 
institutionalized practices that are comprehensive, allow forces to proceed into 
contaminated areas without hesitation, and complement Joint doctrine and JTTPs 
producing a synergy of force against this very real threat.   
Post these progressions, U.S. NSF will adequately possess the capability to 
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